Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-101 *25 May 1995*

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Journalists Condemn Police Actions Against Paper

AU2405145895 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 20 May p 1

[Declaration of the Association of Professional Journalists of Albania—place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Professional Journalists of Albania is closely following the investigation into the use of $400,000 by ZERI I POPULLIT, the organ of the Socialist Party of Albania.

In defending press and journalistic freedom from any illegal form of pressure and violence, the Association is not prejudging the actions of the prosecutor or other judicial bodies, but it is, on the other hand, determined to condemn any act that exceeds regular inquiry procedures and assumes the characteristics of psychological pressure upon journalists.

From this standpoint, the Association considers entirely unnecessary and of an intimidatory nature the show of police force around the ZERI I POPULLIT building at a time when the journalists themselves, who are interested in seeing the truth revealed, were prepared to put themselves at the disposal of justice in a civilized way.

Our Association considers that clarifying the problem of the legal foundations on which ZERI I POPULLIT in 1991 obtained and used $400,000 to buy a printing house has nothing to with the newspaper's present staff, and given the changes that the press's relationships with the state and political parties have undergone over the last three years, it cannot be an aim in itself. We therefore consider as unjust, and strongly oppose, the detention of Mr. Thoma Gellci, the paper's editor in chief and deputy chairman of the Association of Professional Journalists of Albania, who has carried out his duties within the limits of his authority as editor in chief and has never used any bank account other than that of his newspaper, in compliance with the financial regulations for a newspaper with funds of its own that are not secret.

Our Association is inclined to think that taking our fellow journalist Gellci into custody for a matter that has nothing to do with him is an unfortunate misunderstanding that should be immediately corrected so as not to compromise politically the case of the $400,000.

[signed] Chairman Prec Zogaj

Commentary on Beating of 'War Drums' Over Kosovo

AU2405132695 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 24 May 95 p 11

[Commentary by Fehmi Ajvazi: "The War Drums"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war drums have long been beating in the disturbed Balkans, and the Bosnian inferno has now reduced hundreds of thousands of people, thousands of villages, and dozens of towns to dust and ashes. The Bosnian syndrome with its political, economic, cultural, and religious complexity has somehow remained localized and is probably being used as a test case. Besides supposedly being the final contest between East and West—implying a confrontation between the rising capitalist and declining socialist systems—this war involves a confrontation of both Balkan and European forces.

To make the tragedy worse for the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, the Bosnian syndrome is also clad in the garb of an internal religious confrontation. There is no doubt that this war has also eroded the concept of trust. Everybody watches Sarajevo, and the war drums beat. An analysis of thousands of pages would be required to deal with the Bosnian war that followed in the wake of the attack by the former Yugoslav People's Army, the United Nations' recognition of Bosnia as a state, and the cold shoulder that was turned following the fighting among all the parties in Bosnia. However, it is still early, because the war is continuing with no end in sight.

Bosnia is not far from Kosova. It is not known whether anyone has drawn a serious conclusion from the "Bosnian saga," with its failure for the warring sides to reach an understanding. Serbian violence in Kosova is of its own specific kind, as is Albanian resistance to it. The latter seems to be a reasonable response from the Albanians. Nevertheless, in spite of everything, the year 1995 in Kosova began with voices of distress; internal dissension, particularly over the platform of peaceful resistance; moaning; and divisions. Why did this happen so fast and with such public implications? Was the situation in Kosova different before 1995? Why has the situation deteriorated so fast? Who is fanning the flames, and who is banging the war drums in Kosova?

In December 1994, we became acquainted with the CIA's analysis and its forecast for Kosova. We recall that a worsening of the situation in the south (Kosova) was expected in the coming fall. If we analyze the last four months, something special, frustrating, invisible has been forcing our thinking in the direction of war. It is well known that there are 60,000 armed Serbian

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troops here. Their unbridled violence has exceeded all bounds. It is extremely hard to cope with this violence. However, it would be worse to fall into a trap, to be deceived, and to tolerate ill-considered and undisciplined national fervor. Our total subjugation to the point of abject retreat in the face of Serbian violence, our surrender to lamentation, our political misery, our endless pessimism, our lack of faith in victory, and our sloth in these four months cannot be understood as anything but a loss of self-control as individuals and as a people. Thus, the "CIA forecast" somehow floats in front of our eyes. In fact, we have turned our attention to an internal war, which is mere bravado when we think of the occupier and the nature of our platform.

We have defined for ourselves a policy of peace, and this policy cannot be abandoned without a serious political analysis at a national level, while the people must be aware of the results of such an analysis. Belgrade has used force against our present platform but in a conspiratorial fashion, and we should remember that Serbia has never in the last five or six years used force when our work has borne results and we have been united. Why is Belgrade stepping up the violence when we find ourselves in open confrontation with each other? Let us not go into detail, but to what extent are we performing our political duties? To what extent are we paying our 3 percent levy? What faith do we place in creating our parallel government and in realizing the Republic? How much do we want our liberation?

The Balkans are in almost uncontrolled upheaval, Our position is very difficult, and we must therefore be cautious. Our national action is therefore very important. The peoples of the Balkans, besides being subject to influences from spheres of European and world politics, military, cultural, and religious influences, are very divided among themselves, and in a state of confrontation. The Albanians must realize that politics progresses with seriousness, labor, sacrifice, self-awareness, and discipline, and not with breast-beating. Any political mistake is almost irreparable. Let us therefore roll up our sleeves and actively promote our platform of peace, because there is time and it is respected in our region. Those who advocate beating the war drums must be those with nothing better to do than chatter. Let them do something practical for Kosova.

As long as we have the human, economic, and strategic potential we will never allow experiments to be conducted at our expense. Let others fight. We have left enough bones buried among the mountains.

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VMRO-Fatherland Head on Relations With Belgrade

AU2405124595 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 22 May 95 p 7

[Interview with Dimitar Crnomarov, chairman of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Fatherland, VMRO-Fatherland, by Lyubcho Neshkov; place and date not given: "There Can Be No Problems in Relations Between Bulgaria and Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Neshkov] Do you think there are problems in the relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]?

[Crnomarov] Someone wants to create such problems. We must be grateful to Bulgaria for being the first to recognize Macedonia. Bulgaria opened its borders when our situation was most difficult. We receive practically everything, from fuel to food, from Bulgaria. We cannot forget this. If someone wants to play the role of a great Macedonian at the expense of the simple citizens, that is his business. History teaches us that there should be close relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Many of our forefathers fleeing from persecution in Macedonia sought refuge in Bulgaria simply because they felt that Bulgaria is the most friendly country. Why did they not go to Belgrade, Athens, or Tirana?

[Neshkov] How do you interpret the refusal of Greece and Serbia to recognize Macedonia?

[Crnomarov] There is nothing new in their policy. Just as in the past, those countries are today striving to divide Macedonia and seize it. They cannot accept the fact that Macedonia is an independent state. Serbian propaganda in Macedonia has existed for already one and a half centuries. Local television stations in many of our cities carry Serbian films and programs without subtitles. Another example: The taxes on vehicles purchased from Serbia are much lower than the taxes on vehicles imported from other countries. It is impossible to conquer Macedonia by military force. The only remaining possibility is to make it economically dependent on Belgrade. [passage omitted]

[Neshkov] How do you intend to resolve the problem with the Albanians? Some people tell you to seek Serbia's help.

[Crnomarov] Serbia cannot be our liberator. It was our occupier for 80 years. The Albanians must observe all Macedonian laws. We alone can resolve this problem. Everything else is Serbian propaganda.

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Klaus Opposes Havel's Proposal To Award Veterans

LD2405201995 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1630 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Vaclav Havel has appealed to the government to find a way, on the basis of a positive selection, to award selected participants in the national liberation struggle in connection with the 50th anniversary ending World War II. The president wrote this in a letter to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, immediately after the parliament, in a repeated voting, decided not to approve the law awarding certain participants of the national liberation struggle.

According to Klaus, the government accepted the letter with certain hesitation. In his reply to the president, the prime minister will allegedly say that a suitable moment for settling the entire matter was missed. Moreover, the government has no legal or other powers to spend money on such matters.

[Begin Klaus recording] We are unwilling to haggle over this matter. Orders and medals are awarded for participation in resistance. To humiliate this immensely courageous and meritorious human activity by paying money for it—that seems strange and false to me personally and I will always vote against it. I cannot say that the government will vote against it. On my behalf, I am saying that I will always vote against it, in any case.

I do not wish that the scramble for money in this matter harms the indisputable high value of what these people had done. I do not believe that this is in their interest. I am almost afraid that this is becoming an external and false political scramble, and that these people are being misused. I do not wish it upon them and they do not deserve it; they deserve much more from us.

Finally, we do not think that it is possible to attempt making a selection, that somebody who performed a certain positive action 50 years ago should be assessed by other, additional criteria of different times. It is simply an instruction how to cause a conflict in society, and we do not consider it necessary or sensible. [end recording]

Klaus Says Miners Unemployment Fears 'Unfounded'

AU2405172195 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 May 95 p 3

[Article by "les": "The State Will Give Money To Close Mines, Klaus Said"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ostrava—Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, who was visiting coal mines in Ostrava on 22 May, said that, naturally, the state must continue taking part in financing the closure of mines. He said that the present fears of mining trade unionists of losing their jobs after the planned merger of mines were unfounded.

"A rate of unemployment as low as in Ostrava does not exist in any other European region based on coal mining and the heavy industry. While unemployment in Ostrava is at 5 percent, similar foreign centers reach 15 to 20 percent," Klaus said.

The merger of mines is an organizational issue that concerns only the company management, in his opinion. Trade unionists should not politicize this issue, and it should be no reason for them to organize pressure actions, he said.

UN Owes Army 'More Than $20 Million'

AU2405160295 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 May 95 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "The United Nations Owes the Czech Army Millions of Dollars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The United Nations owes the Republic more than $20 million for the hardware and equipment the Czech Army has supplied to its UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] unit in the former Yugoslavia.

The United Nations is in a profound economic crisis; many member states owe it more than $2.0 billion in contributions. At the same time, in guaranteeing peacekeeping operations, the United Nations, besides paying the troops' salaries, also pays for the hardware and equipment that the blue helmets use, which are from their own armies' arsenals. Maintaining the UNPROFOR contingent has cost the United Nations $1.8 billion so far.

Repaying the debts to the countries that send their units to the peacekeeping forces will obviously become more complicated, because the United Nations intends to change its original decision and not pay back the money within four years, but gradually over the course of 10 years.

Of the outstanding Czech claim of $21.4 million, $2.2 million is for equipping a field hospital in Knin, $1.2 million is for spare parts, and the rest is for all the hardware and equipment.

The Czech battalion in Croatia, for example, uses several dozen OT-64 armored personnel carriers and Tatra 815 trucks. The cost of one armored vehicle is estimated at $50,000. Sending this hardware to the mission was economically advantageous for the army, because the majority of the vehicles were destined

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for scrap. Destroying one OT-64 would cost the state approximately $1,200.

Meanwhile, the Republic does not owe the United Nations anything, because, following the breakup of the Federation, it had not yet been included in any category of those paying for the peacekeeping missions. Until this happens, it is, according to the Foreign Ministry, capable of settling all outstanding claims.

Military Research Said in Financial Difficulties

AU2405160695 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 23 May 95 p 16

[Article by "gag": "Military Research in Difficulties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Although Czech military technical experts are among the world's elite, their research has found itself in difficulties. According to high-level Czech bank officials, this is true of Aero Vodochody and its L-159 combat aircraft project as well as of the passive hyperbolic Tamara radar system (that is supposed to identify the "invisible" F-117 Stealth and B-2 aircraft) manufactured by Tesla Pardubice.

Financial and technical experts draw attention to the fact that Czech research is suffering from lack of funds. Jaroslav Borak, chairman of the Aero board of directors, says that the L-159 light combat aircraft is absolutely top-notch in its category. "Tamara, which has an edge of several years over the world competitors, is also being overlooked," adds Vlastimil Pech, a former Tesla employee and Tamara's spiritual father. According to Pech, Tamara's hyperbolic system enables the immediate and highly accurate identification of the source of radar signals—aircraft, vessels, or ground equipment. "It is another independent source of information, one that makes it possible to forestall air accidents such as those caused by the mistaking of civilian aircraft for military aircraft," Pech says.

"Research now focuses on Tamara's more economical operation and a substantial reduction of its size," Pech admits. With a bit of exaggeration he estimates that the electronics will no longer have to be installed on several Tatra trucks, but should make do within a few small suitcases. According to information available to LIDOVE NOVINY, it is not Tesla Pardubice that is involved in this research, but top-notch experts who have left the company because of disagreements with its management.

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Kovac on Meciar's Call for His Resignation

AU2405124695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 May 95 p 2

[Article by "(r)": "M. Kovac Said That He Cannot Take the Prime Minister's Calls for His Resignation Seriously"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"It is ridiculous. If I can relieve Engineer Sarkocy of his oath of silence, then I will; but let him say something," said President M. Kovac in an interview for VTV television. This was in response to a statement by J. Sarkocy (businessman and former staff member at the Czechoslovak Embassy in London from 1986 to 1989) that, if the Slovak Information Service director relieves him of his oath of silence, he can reveal interesting information about M. Kovac's activities when he was the deputy director of the Zivnobanka branch in London from 1967 to 1969. The president said the following on this subject in the VTV interview: "I can assure citizens that no financial or any other misdemeanors exist. This is another ridiculous attempt to further discredit the president and I believe that citizens are also able to judge for themselves on these attempts." M. Kovac also responded to V. Meciar's reiteration in Kosice on 19 May that the best solution would be if the president were to resign. "The president, like the prime minister, knows what his obligations and responsibilities are. The president is not foisting himself on this society, the president was elected properly and, therefore, I cannot take the prime minister's calls seriously," said M. Kovac. The president also emphasized that "if I were to obey such calls, I would be taking an irresponsible step that could destabilize our situation." In reference to the possible referendum on confidence in the president, hinted at by the prime minister, M. Kovac said "I am convinced that I enjoy sufficient trust among citizens. I become convinced of this unequivocally everywhere I go. But, I do not make light of the fact that there are also groups of citizens who would like me to step down prematurely. However, we have to respect one another; just as we respect the results of the parliamentary elections, we must also respect the decisions of the previous parliament." In connection with Friday's appeal by some special-interest groups (for example, the Permanent Conference of the Slovak Intelligentsia—Slovakia Plus, the Stur Society, the Association of Slovak Writers, the Association of Slovak Journalists, and the Society of Slovak Intelligentsia—Korene [Roots]) that he resign, M. Kovac emphasized that "the office of president is not something that this or that group can trifle with according to its will. Obviously, I am not Slovak enough for this group of citizens. This is a group of self-styled patriots. Anyone who does not fit in with their image of a Slovak, is not patriotic enough. I cannot govern myself according to such views."

Kozlik To Offer New Form of Clearing to CR

AU2405135395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 May 95 p 2

[TASR report: "An Offer To Discuss a New Form of Clearing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, who took part in the 22 May meeting of finance ministers from the EU and associated countries, has said that the Slovak side intends to propose to the Czech Republic [CR] that a discussion on a new form of clearing be held. The essence of the Slovak proposal is to abolish the current account old block [payments made prior to 8 February 1993] and the credit margin, and to set the exchange rate deviation at a maximum of 2.0 percent.

In reply to a question on whether Slovakia is willing to accede to the Czech Republic's proposal to abolish the payments agreement on the basis of a mutual decision, he said that this step would have the same legal effect as a unilateral withdrawal by the Czech side. "If the Czech side annuls the agreement, then it will be over," he commented. S. Kozlik said that Slovakia would refuse to conduct trade with the Czech Republic in the Czech koruna if clearing were to be abolished. He said that this would be a risky solution, because the Czech koruna would not immediately be a freely convertible currency. At their meeting, ministers from 24 European states are discussing the situation for preparing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the EU internal market and are reporting on the economic situation in their own states.

Slovakia accepts the so-called white book of legislative measures for the associated states harmonization with the European Union in the domestic market sphere, but it considers it to be an open document. S. Kozlik made this statement after the joint meeting between the EU finance ministers and their partners from the associated countries. He also met with Czech Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik on 22 May. The Czech deputy prime minister told him that he stands by his point of view that the payments agreement between the Czech and Slovak Republics can be abolished on 1 October this year.

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Opposition Leaders Decry Police Acts Against DU

AU2405135495 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 May 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "bog, jo": "Verification of Signatures on the Democratic Union Petition Sheets Violates Citizens' Right of Petition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—"It is scandalous," Democratic Union [DU] Chairman Jozef Moravcik said yesterday, in reaction to reports that the police have been verifying the authenticity of signatures on DU petition sheets directly in the signatories' apartments. [passage omitted]

Moravcik stressed that the police are not devoting themselves to things that they should be doing, but "are meddling in politics" in this way. He qualified this as a serious threat to the citizen's right of petition. "People are being intimidated in this way so that they no longer express their views by means of petitions, which is one of the basic institutions of a democratic society. This could negatively affect any new political party that may want to run in the elections," Moravcik added.

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], told SME in this context that "the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has decided to misuse the power bodies of the state to deal with its internal party problems, by forcing police bodies to verify the authenticity of signatures on DU petition sheets by interrogating the signatories. This activity grossly violates the citizens' basic rights and freedoms in exercising the right of petition and protecting personal data," Jan Carnogursky said. Like DU Chairman Jozef Moravcik, he qualified the procedure as "an attempt to intimidate citizens and prevent them from freely expressing their political interests." According to his words, the HZDS is escalating tension and deepening an atmosphere of confrontation in this way. "The KDH will effectively resist such a policy and appeals to citizens of the Slovak Republic not to let themselves be intimidated," the KDH chairman declared.

Peter Zajac from the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute (SKOI) stressed that the police action represented a gross infringement on civic freedoms and basic human rights. "Besides, it represents a gross and ostentatious abuse of the authorities' powers for carrying out activities that do not come within their jurisdiction under the law. This is yet another case of the violation of democracy in Slovakia on the part of the ruling power. The SKOI sharply protests this," he added. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 23 May on pages 1 and 2 carries a 500-word report by Ivan Sedliar, Zita Sujova, and TASR on the affair, which includes the following passage: "By investigating citizens who had signed petition sheets in support of the DU's participation in the elections, the HZDS is seeking to discredit the DU and restore a community of fear in Slovakia, DU Deputy Chairman Jan Budaj said during a break in yesterday's meeting of the DU Political Committee. According to Budaj, this is the ruling power's direct reaction to the fact that public rallies had confirmed citizens' support for President Michal Kovac. The DU regards the deployment of the police in this operation as a misuse of them. It will hold the individual who issued this order personally liable for criminal acts committed in this period. DU Deputy Chairman Roman Kovac stressed that the DU's participation in parliament was unshakeable and voiced the suspicion that the copies of the petition sheets being used may not be genuine, because no notary public had been present during their unsealing. The DU recommends that signatories to the petition sheets do not succumb to fear, and that they should refuse to testify in accordance with their rights. The DU offers them legal protection."]

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Official on Progress in Purchasing Russian Weapons

AU2405203095 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 24 May 95 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Ministry spokesman Lajos Erdelyi by Attila Lenart; place and date not given: "What Kind of Weapons Will We Receive?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first round of Russian-Hungarian expert talks on armament purchases in exchange for the remaining state debt has ended. They will probably agree on the armored vehicles that are part of the Hungarian plans. We have previously made other requests, too—for example, for antiaircraft missile systems. We asked Defense Ministry spokesman Lajos Erdelyi if it is possible that we will not get everything the ministry wanted.

[Erdelyi] The talks have not reached a final result because the two sides will again sit at the negotiating table in Budapest in a few weeks. Therefore, it would be difficult to talk about a final result or concrete achievements. As a matter of fact, we have negotiated on missiles, but not on missile systems.

[Lenart] What is it that the Russians obviously would not like to sell to us, and what are the differences between the positions of the two sides?

[Erdelyi] The majority of the Hungarian Army's armaments are of Russian origin and we would like to get all kinds of spare parts for these. On the other hand, Russian interest dictates that they should, if possible, sell weapon systems to us, because to maintain and operate these, we will also need spare parts in the future, which would mean further business for them.

[Lenart] Is it true that we are not getting spare parts for the MiG-29 fighter planes that we received in a similar way for a state debt?

[Erdelyi] This is not true. We do indeed have some problems with the spare part supply of MiG-29's, but this is not any more serious than trying to get major parts for other equipment either. However, rather than lack of willingness, the Russian conditions themselves are the reason for this.

Editorial on Initiative To Lift FRY Embargo

AU2405183995 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 May 95 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Aczel: "Sound Selfishness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian and Ukrainian Governments took a very sound step when they decided to initiate the suspension of international economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, the Serbian-Montenegrin federation—and in fact, as far as I can see without any conditions. No such thing was mentioned in the Hungarian-Ukrainian joint statement.

This is an important aspect. A few weeks ago, in this newspaper, we already suggested the lifting of the embargo, but without the United Nations' stipulating that Yugoslavia must recognize Croatia and/or Bosnia-Herzegovina within their "Tito" borders in exchange. We indicated that this would not be an acceptable solution for Serbian President Milosevic because it contains an element of coercion. I am not saying that it is impossible to blackmail Milosevic under all circumstances; however, as the sanctions are completely unjustified and unjust according to the Serbian "state philosophy," it cannot be expected that Serbia would make concessions for their lifting (suspension). The president would destroy his own prestige by doing this. According to others, he would destroy only his own castles in the air, but this is beside the point. The main point is that Milosevic wishes to recognize the two other successor states of his own free will, rather than under pressure. It is very important for him at least to give this impression. The recognition of Croatia and especially Bosnia would anyway be equal to betraying the Serbs living there and giving up the notion of Greater Serbia. If this, nevertheless, has to be done then it cannot be done by forcing the Serbian Serbs into doing it. The Serbs are only willing to do this voluntarily with heads held high.

Actually, Milosevic is capable of making any deals—especially with Croatian President Tudjman. The two of them have already made secret agreements from Graz to Karadjordjevo [locations of "secret" meetings in Austria and Serbia], and I have no reason to assume that the recognition of the Republic of Croatia's independence and sovereignty by Yugoslavia was not among these. As we could see a few weeks ago, the Serbian president acknowledged the forceful reannexation of western Slavonia to the Croatian state without a word—he does not insist on things that he does not necessarily have to. He is a much more sober politician than that.

All in all, invalidating the punitive measures and reintegrating the Yugoslav economy into Europe would be good because it could encourage Yugoslavia, freed from its exile, to recognize Croatia (and perhaps later, Bosnia, too), thus forcing the Croatian Serbs to give up their own state (the Krajina Serb Republic). This could help gradually to end the Serb-Croat conflict, which is the source and root cause of all the other south Slav conflicts.

Resolving, or preventing the restart of, the Serb-Croat conflict is a Hungarian interest in the purest sense of

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the word. The same can be said about ending the losses (never compensated for by the United Nations) that Hungary is suffering because of the embargo. It would be particularly good for our budget to be relieved of the huge burden, worth 100 billion [currency not specified], which the embargo means for us. The Antall and Boross governments were also aware of this, but the time was not favorable for their efforts on this issue.

I suspect that some willingness does exist to accept the Hungarian-Ukrainian initiative and I think it is possible that Budapest or Kiev have already received some external encouragement. It is possible that something that the world's leading powers would only do reluctantly—or not even in this way—can be rather attractive as an initiative of less influential but much more and directly affected countries. Not to mention that a Hungarian gesture toward Yugoslavia—I hope—can have such beneficial effects that it would also influence the fate of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. I would call this, if I may, sound selfishness.

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'Contacts' Being Pursued for B-H Recognition

AU2405145295 Paris AFP in English 1351 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, May 24 (AFP)—The Contact Group is pursuing "contacts" with Belgrade to get Serbia to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], despite the failure of a U.S. envoy's talks with President Slobodan Milosevic, a French Foreign Ministry spokesman said Wednesday [24 May].

"The contacts have not been interrupted. They are continuing. The Contact Group is pursuing its efforts," spokesman Francois Gouyette said.

He added that Paris remained "in close touch with the Americans and its other partners" in the five nation group, which also includes Britain, Germany and Russia.

Gouyette added that Foreign Minister Herve de Charette met late Tuesday with Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Yegor Ivanov.

The two agreed "on the need to pursue the Contact Group's efforts toward (making) a significant breakthrough."

Earlier in London, the British Foreign Office said Britain still hoped that "a deal can be struck" for Serbian recognition of Bosnia, despite the U.S. envoy's having left Belgrade empty-handed Tuesday after a week of talks.

Russia's representative to the Contact Group arrived in Belgrade on Wednesday, in a further attempt to persuade Milosevic to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic on Lifting of Siege in Next 6 Months

AU2405201095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 May 95

[Report by B-H Press on an interview with B-H President Alija Izetbegovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The six-day efforts of Frasure have not yielded any results; Milosevic has not recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H]. Are you disappointed, was the first question we asked President Izetbegovic.

No, because I was not expecting very much. I was more worried about the price.

Is this Karadzic's victory?

No. It would have been his victory had Milosevic rejected just recognition, but this is not the case. On the contrary, it seems that Milosevic has accepted the principle; the misunderstanding arose over the conditions. They disagreed while bargaining, so Karadzic has nothing to be happy about.

What is the crux of the matter?

The problems arose over the suspension and possible reimposition of sanctions. Milosevic demanded that Butrus-Ghali and not the Sanctions Committee should have the power to reimpose the sanctions. It seems that they are great friends, and this does not surprise us. The Americans rejected this, and I hope that they will now be more clear on some points, if they already are not.

The fate of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] will be decided in the coming period? What do you expect, was our next question.

Several options have been proposed. I expect that UNPROFOR will stay, but with slightly broader authority, and—I hope—decisiveness. As far as we are concerned, it seems that the benefits and drawbacks of UNPROFOR have leveled out. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the drawbacks will tip the scales, and it will then be better for us if they leave.

Today they are pounding us from the hills. What are we going to do?

For the time being, we are defending ourselves and responding, but one day we are going to get them off our backs.

When will this happen?

Sometime between 25 May and 25 November of this year. That is all I can say, said President Alija Izetbegovic in an exclusive statement for B-H Press.

Silajdzic on Message to U.S., Sarajevo Ultimatum

AU2505130195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 25 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The message to the U.S. Government and the reply to it, as well as yesterday's ultimatum issued by General Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR Commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, are two basic things to which Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic referred when speaking with journalists from several foreign and domestic media sources this morning. Talking with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic for Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina was Mladen Bosnjak:

[Begin recording] [Bosnjak] Mr. Silajdzic, as part of the diplomatic activity carried out by you personally and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and its highest bodies, last night you sent a message to the United States. I would like you to say something about that message

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and its reaction, or to put it differently, about the reply to the message.

[Silajdzic] The message was sent via the U.S. Embassy charge d'affaires here. It said that we in Sarajevo are of the opinion that the U.S. Government should use all its influence in order to have resolutions and the ultimatum [word indistinct] Sarajevo implemented. (?On Tuesday) I received Mr. Menzies, charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, who told me [word indistinct], conveyed the [word indistinct] of the U.S. Government that NATO forces are instructed to attack any target and any point where General Smith's demands regarding yesterday's [word indistinct] are violated.

[Bosnjak] As regards that demand, that is, the ultimatum Gen. Smith issued yesterday, how would you comment it?

[Silajdzic] I think that it is good, of course provided it is implemented. If this resoluteness remains (?in force). It is very important that NATO member countries act together and decide to implement that as well. It is very important for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crisis would have long ended and the aggression stopped had these NATO member countries adopted a more resolute and unified stance.

Unfortunately, the so-called [word indistinct] of the United Nations interfered with that, the United Nations [words indistinct], and then the problem came about. Because, as you know, the United Nations have here a completely different role and a different mandate, let me put it this way, an extended mandate of the Red Cross, so the problem arose there. Now that NATO acts jointly and resolutely, results must be seen.

[Bosnjak] A short question: The ultimatum refers to heavy arms, heavy weaponry of both sides. To put it simply, in what position are the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and city defense placed with Gen. Smith's ultimatum and, if you will, the NATO ultimatum of February last year?

[Silajdzic] As you know, we must defend ourselves. Therefore, we are going to defend ourselves no matter what if we are attacked.

However, there is a big difference between what the Pale Serbs have and what we have, as the Pale Serbs got everything they needed from the Yugoslav People's Army, including personnel. We did not, because the arms embargo is still hanging over our heads. Our hands are tied; we do not have heavy artillery. For that reason I think that if NATO subsequently implements this ultimatum, this can help solve the crisis and stop the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

Banja Luka: Muslim Attack Kills Civilians

AU2505084595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 24 May carries within its regular 35-minute newscast a series of reports on the combat situation in "former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Sarajevo correspondent Vlado Popovic says that "a little before 0900 hours [0700 GMT], the terrorist Party of Democratic Action forces renewed combat activity in Sarajevo." He goes on to say that "the Muslim army first used artillery shells of every caliber to shower all of Serb Sarajevo, endangering the lives of civilians and inflicting enormous material damage. An eight-year-old girl was killed in the wider Vraca area, on Ohrid Street, and four students were wounded on Ilidza Street. Four civilians were wounded on Grbavica and Vrace Streets. One man was hit in the Grlica district." The report also says that "after an all-out artillery attack on Serb Sarajevo at about 1000 hours, the enemy focused attacks on Zlatiste and the Jewish cemetery, trying to cut off the road between Sarajevo and Pale. Fierce combined attacks by Muslim formations continue even as we speak."

The studio announcer wraps up the report by saying that "Muslim attacks have been halted in the meantime and Serb soldiers successfully launched a counterattack."

Describing the situation on the Grahovo-Glamoc front, correspondent Veljko Bosnic says that "joint Croat armies continue launching combined artillery-infantry attacks. High-intensity shelling with about 20 82-mm mortars has been reported on the Glamoc front. The enemy opened intensive small arms fire along the separation line, especially in the areas of Mala Golija, Kolicine, and Skadimovci." He goes on to say that "Serb soldiers neutralized a reconnaissance-commando incursion in the wider Salanka area." He proceeds to describe the situation on the Grahovo front and says that "in the afternoon, Croat armies have again started shelling Serb villages in the hinterland of the Grahovo municipality."

Posavina correspondent Marko Draganic reports "constant regrouping of enemy formations, army engineer work along separation lines around Brcko." He says that "this morning, in the Lukici area, Serb soldiers forestalled a reconnaissance-commando incursion into their territory."

Sonja Kuzmic reports that "overnight and today, the enemy stepped up attacks on Serb positions and residential areas in the wider Doboj region. This morning, a Muslim infantry attack on Serb defense lines in the Panjik

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area, in the southern part of the Trebava front, was preceded by artillery preparation. Determined to succeed, Serb soldiers repulsed the attack, forcing the enemy to its initial positions. Two Serb soldiers were wounded." She goes on to say that "82-mm mortars were used to target positions in Dubokovac area" as well as the positions south of Doboj. The report also says that "the enemy fired seven 82-mm mortars from Debelo Brdo and opened fire with antiaircraft artillery from the direction of Simunovici," that "strong attacks provoked a response," but that there were no friendly casualties.

Describing the combat situation on the Ozren-Vozuca front, correspondent Ljubinko Djuric says that "Izetbegovic's followers from Zavidovici were very bloodthirsty. From their strongholds northeast of the town, Muslim soldiers opened strong fire from antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machine guns, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, targeting Serb residential areas in the valley of the Bosna." He goes on to the Ozren front and says that "from the direction of Maglaj and Tesanj, rifle grenades and heavy small arms fire showered Serb positions on the right bank of the Bosna and the village of Sevarlije."

Doboj correspondent Lidija Zaric reports fresh artillery attacks on the town center and says that "at 1830, enemy artillery used high caliber shells to pound the town center. One person was killed, several civilians were wounded. A general alert signal was sounded and people are in bunkers. The attacks continue as we speak."

According to correspondent Dusko Jorgic, "Muslim units maintained their intensive artillery-infantry attacks on Serb defense positions on the Teslic front," especially in the areas of Basca, Kraguljac, Smolin, Zecja Glava. He says that "more than 100 artillery shells paved the way for infantry attacks on Serb defense lines" and that "RS Army soldiers repulsed all attacks and reported regrouping and reinforcement of Muslim units in the direction of Zecja Glava."

Quoting 1st Krajina Corps information, correspondent Sinisa Novakovic says that "the Muslims stepped up attacks on Serb defense lines on the Vlasic front. Late last night, Muslim units carried out two fierce artillery-infantry attacks from the direction of Harambasine Vode and Snjeznice; at the same time, Muslim units launched an infantry attack from the direction of Bukovacko Brdo." The report also says that "the Muslims also used tanks and mortars to target Serb defense lines and the free Serb territory, so that several shells landed in the Rakite area." He concludes to say that "all Muslim attacks were stopped and all Serb defense lines remain stable."

Describing the situation on the Kupres front, the studio announcer says that "there was no significant combat activity" but that "Muslim forces and joint units of the Croatian Defense Council and the Croatian Army regrouped their forces, which is indicative of new attacks on Serb defense positions."

He goes on to the Srbobran front and says that "yesterday, Muslim soldiers launched small arms attacks from the direction of Podripci and Drvetina at Serb defense lines in the areas of Kopcici and Brezicani." According to him, "Muslim formations fired dozens of mortars from the wider Konjic area at Serb positions in the areas of Glvataticevo and Borak."

Describing the Treskavica front, he says that "RS Army soldiers, in the area of Djokin Toranj, repulsed a strong Muslim attack. The separation line remain stable. On the Trebinje part of the Herzegovina front, members of the regular Croatian Army used heavy machine guns and antiaircraft artillery to target Serb positions in the areas of Lekova and Orasje."

Lidija Beslic reports on "a quiet day on the Majevica front, marked only by sporadic Muslim attacks on Serb positions."

Sudan Mujaheddin Reportedly Join Buizin Brigade

LD2305160595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1259 GMT 23 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Petrovac, 23 May (TANJUG)—[Passage omitted] Velkaton Radio has learned from reliable sources that a large number of mujaheddin from Islamic countries, mainly from Sudan, have arrived to join the notorious Buzim brigade in northwest Bosnia.

Daily: Mujaheddin Training in Albania for Bosnia

LD2405201395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1840 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 24 (TANJUG)—Mujaheddin are being trained in Albania to fight in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES Wednesday quoted well informed sources as saying.

Albania recruits fighters for Bosnia among thousands of Muslim refugees from Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey, the paper said.

Following orders of the West and Turkey, Albania is forcing Muslim refugees to attend brief military training on its territory before sending them as special force to fight together with the Muslim army in Bosnia.

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The mujaheddin, known in Bosnia as the 'flying ducks,' as a rule go to areas of heaviest fighting, the paper said.

The paper said Turkey particularly insisted on forming such units because it was a way of partly easing the problem of its unbending Kurds.

Western European countries have amply awarded Albania for its dirty job and have protected it from condemnation of the international community, the paper said.

Croats, Muslims Coordinate Stances in Talks

LD2405194795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 24 May 95

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, the president of the presidential council of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, held talks in Mostar this morning with Muhamed Filipovic, the Bosnian ambassador in Switzerland [name and title as heard] and Izetbegovic's envoy at the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Milan Sutalo has a report.

[Sutalo] We discussed the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Zubak said after the talks and added:

[Zubak] "Our stances on the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are identical in many issues. We agreed that it was needed and necessary for the relevant representatives of the Croat and Bosnian Muslim nations to sit at a table again and, in view of the current situation and relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, discuss and define their stances and their views as to how to proceed and what stances to adopt on all possible future situations and solutions for the crisis Bosnia-Herzegovina."

[Sutalo] Asked whether these talks were held in order to discuss [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic's statement that the federation is a union of cantons, rather than a union of two sovereign nations, Zubak said:

[Zubak] "The reason for these talks was not the latest statement by Izetbegovic, but his statement is certainly an additional reason, which confirms the need and necessity for us to sit down and frankly discuss all aspects of solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

[Sutalo] The initiative for the Croat and Muslim sides to clarify their positions again, which was launched in Mostar today, came after the failed efforts by the American mediator Robert Frasure to force Milosevic to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Filipovic believes that this will weaken Milosevic further and speed up the denouement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Filipovic] "This is precisely why we must sort out all the political issues here. We must know where we are standing and on what positions we will be when the denouement, which is now very near, comes."

[Sutalo] President Zubak reiterated that if the peace efforts yielded no result, the Croat and Bosniak sides would move from defense operations to liberating actions, at a time and place that suits them. It is obvious that the Serb side's political and military positions are constantly weakening, which has been confirmed by their debacle in Posavina. On the other hand, time is on our side, President Zubak said in conclusion.

Croats, Muslims on Opening Kiseljak Road

LD2405192995 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 24 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Vares area, the Muslims are continuing to sabotage the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. We have a report by Mirjana Prutina:

[Prutina] A new attempt to open the Kiseljak-Vares-Dastansko Blue route, to lift the blockade of part of the Vares municipality which is controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], and to open up roads for free movement along them failed again in Vares today.

At the (?Kolonija) UN checkpoint today, representatives of the Muslim Bosniak police from Vares, commander [name indistinct], and commander Omer Spahic, said that they are allowing the Dastansko-Kiseljak bus service to operate only twice a week—on Tuesdays and Thursdays—and they have specified that it must have a police escort across the municipality of Vares. It was also announced that all other journeys by private car or on foot between Dastansko and Vares are not permitted and that this has been ordered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

All this is an indication of the cooperativeness and readiness of the Muslim side for cooperation in the area of the Vares municipality, and that attempts are being made, by partial solutions and by setting conditions, to overcome the situation which has come about following the decision of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Presidential Council to implement reciprocal measures in appropriate areas controlled by the HVO.

It was stressed once again by the Croat side, and it was stated: We demand the opening of the road and freedom of movement, in keeping with the signed agreements of the joint commission on the territory of the Federation; for us all, ultimatum-style demands by the Muslim side are unacceptable.

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Croats Terrorized by Mujahedin in Travnik

LD2405200695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of Herzeg-Bosna led by Dario Kordic and Zdenko Cosic, the chairman and secretary general of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, and including Herzeg-Bosna deputy prime ministers Drago Bilandzija and Perica Jukic and Croat ministers in the federal government [of Bosnia-Herzegovina], paid a visit to Travnik today where it was briefed on the grave conditions under which the local Croat population lives.

Around 19,000 Croats have been evicted from Travnik. Croat property is being plundered and destroyed, and the Croat population is being terrorized by mujahedin who still hold 36 Croats from Guca Gora prisoner. At the same time more than 35,000 Muslims who were evicted from areas under Serb occupation have found shelter in Travnik. In talks with the Muslim leadership of Travnik a possibility was sought for the return of Croat refugees, which is the main condition for the building of the federation in this area.

Karadzic on Milosevic, Deteriorating Situation

LD2405165795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1608 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 24 May (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said in Banja Luka today "that he has nothing against Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic participating in the peace process," but "that the three warring sides in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are the main factors determining whether there is war or peace."

"We are prepared to cooperate with Milosevic, but whoever wants to achieve peace should have talks with all the warring sides," President Karadzic told journalists in a break in the proceedings of the third extraordinary session of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic.

Commenting on the renewed Muslim attacks on the Sarajevo and Bihac fronts, the president of the Serb Republic told an SRNA journalist that today, during a visit to units of the Second [Bosnian Serb] Krajina Corps near Krupa na Uni [Serb name for Bosanska Krupa], he personally assured himself of the fact that in this area "Muslim attacks have been stepped up and the Serb defenses are solid."

"We will undertake counterattacks wherever we are attacked," the president of the Serb Republic stressed. He assessed that the situation is also deteriorating on the Sarajevo front by each day.

"The situation will certainly get even worse, because the Muslims are not ready for any solution at all with respect to Sarajevo," Karadzic said. He concluded that "the Muslim side is obviously driving the Serbs into defeating it, although the Serb Republic wanted to solve matters by political means."

Karadzic: UN No Longer 'Factor of Peace'

LD2405084295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0145 GMT 25 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 25 May (SRNA)—After what happened in western Slavonia, the United Nations has no moral right to issue threats to anyone including the Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, said in Banja Luka late last night.

Commenting on an ultimatum issued by Robert Smith, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] commander for formber Bosnia-Herzegovina, that all three warring sides will be bombarded unless they cease combat activities, Karadzic stressed that the Serb side "no longer recognizes the United Nations as a factor of peace."

"The Serb population in western Slavonia was massacred, and if Smith now orders air strikes against Serb positions we will treat the United Nations as our enemies," the Serb Republic president warned.

Serbia, Montenegro Invited Into Unification

LD2505090095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0145 GMT 25 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 25 May (SRNA)—We are fully aware of the responsibility before our people and we know that there is not much time, but there is no reason to postpone the process of the all-Serb unification, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, stated in Banja Luka tonight.

President Karadzic and Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, invited Serbia and Montenegro to join the unification.

"If they are unable or reluctant to do so—although we believe they are able to and there is no reason to wait—we have to make very speedy steps toward unification," Karadzic said following the first session of parliamentary commissions which are working on the plan and program for the unification of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina.

"This must be a single Serbdom [jedno Srpstvo] in a single well organized and efficient state which is capable of defending and protecting its people," the Serb Republic president explained adding that "after the end of the war, the joint state must be a safe home to all the Serbs west of the Drina."

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President Martic said that "leaderships of the two republics have already proved their serious intentions before their own people."

According to him, these are "the final minutes for taking a more resolute step toward realizing Serb national goals."

President Martic stressed that the idea of creating a single Serb state on the territory of former Yugoslavia must be put into practice, as this is the will of the Serb people expressed in two referendums. He went on to say:

"We would like this first step to be as quick as possible; we would like Belgrade to be our capital, but for the time being we have to do what we are compelled to do and what we have decided to do." [passage omitted]

Commander Egzeta of HVO Regiment Interviewed

95BA0247D Mostar HRVATSKI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 28 Apr 95 p 12

[Interview with Ivica Egzeta by Antun Mrkonjic; place and date not given: "We Are Stronger Every Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Serbs are not settling down on the Zepce battlefield, but they do not have any prospects for anything more serious. The defenders of Zepac will gain the barracks. We will also liberate Komusina.*

The army of Croats that would later defend Maglaj, Zepce, and Zavidovice was created back in 1991 in the interior of Tupanovac. Fierce battles followed against the Serbs for Komusina, Dubrava, Maglaj, and Zepce itself. Then an attempt was made to conquer this region by a considerably larger Muslim army, which, however, fared like all those who want to drive Croats from their homes. A year later, the Zepce battlefield is considerably more peaceful. That, however, does not mean that the war is over there and that the Zepce warriors are no longer in the trenches. We also ascertained that in a conversation with Ivica Egzeta, the new commander of the 111st HVO [Croatian Defense Council] regiment.

[Egzeta] Recently we have observed occasional challenges from the Bosnian Serbs on this battlefield. There are no frontal attacks, although on several occasions they have tried to infiltrate saboteur groups behind our positions; we frustrated that in time and prevented the incursions. All of the defense lines are solid and impenetrable, and there is no fear about this area. Although there have been no major combat operations for almost a year, that does not mean that our army has relaxed and that it is not ready for any surprises. On the contrary, we are stronger, more organized, and more careful every day. After all, members of our regiment participated when necessary in the defense of other parts of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna.

[Mrkonjic] How much progress has been made in restructuring the HVO in this area?

[Egzeta] We have virtually completed the structure. Currently, we are strengthening the guard units and special purpose units. Otherwise, we carried out the restructuring as we were going, but I must say that even earlier we trained special and home defense units, so it was easier for us to adapt to the new demands from the Main Staff. We are capable of carrying out any commands in the shortest possible time.

[Mrkonjic] What about the barracks?

[Egzeta] It is well known that the 111st Croatian Brigade, now an HVO regiment, does not have an extremely needed barracks. The war caught us virtually in the open, but with the decrease in combat operations we began to build a barracks. With help from the Defense Ministry of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna and the municipal authorities, we have completed the first phase of what will be a large project. When all the work is done, it will be a facility that will meet our needs. It really is a large capital project, and I must say that the barracks is being built mostly by our soldiers and engineers.

[Mrkonjic] In defending their homes, freedom, and existence, the Croats of Zepce have lost hundreds of young lives, and more than 1,000 soldiers have been wounded. What do you do to make life easier for the victims?

[Egzeta] The welfare section of the Defense Department takes care of the victims of the Homeland War, but the 111st Regiment tries to help the victims of the Homeland War in various ways. It is a big obligation and an extremely serious job. It is not easy to satisfy even the minimum requirements of the victims, of whom there are many in our area. Attempting to solve their problems is a high priority. The families of the fallen defenders and wounded soldiers receive regular wages. Monetary assistance is regularly paid, we distribute packages for children in accordance with our capabilities, and we will provide apartments for the most seriously disabled people. Otherwise, we regularly visit the seriously disabled who are being treated in Croatia. The Defense Ministry of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna has provided two automobiles for them. On this occasion as well, I must emphasize the assistance from the Defense Ministry, but also the civilian municipal authorities.

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[Mrkonjic] Someone claimed that the Zepce Croats also had their own 112th Brigade, now a regiment, composed of deserters. What about those guys?

[Egzeta] Recently we have observed several cases of the return of young men who had left our area before or during the war. They probably realized their mistake, but saw that those who stayed to fight forgave them, and the authorities also decided not to punish them.

The returnees are immediately included in the units, and they are suitable fighters. Their views are now understandably quite different. They saw that everything was not that terrible. Although it is not a mass phenomenon, in any case it is encouraging, because the battle is not yet over. At the end of this conversation, I would like to welcome all those who are hesitating and invite them to come and defend our region with our joint forces. I am sending a message to the enemy that the 111st Croatian Home Guard Regiment of the HVO is now even stronger, tougher, and more experienced, well-armed, and determined to stay here and recover what we previously lost; I am thinking primarily of Komusina. There is no need to be concerned about Zepce now, and as in the past, we will participate to the best of our ability in the liberation of all parts of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna.

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Valentic Comments on Visit by Iran's Habibi

LD2405221795 Tehran IRNA in English 2047 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 25, IRNA—On the eve of the visit to Croatia by First Deputy President of Iran Hasan Habibi, Prime Minister of Croatia Nikica Valentic here Wednesday said the visit would be another stride toward further broadening of relations between Iran and Croatia.

He said cooperation between the two countries in ship-building, petrochemical industries, transportation and their participation in further development of ports would be of special economic value.

The Croatian premier focusing on the trilateral talks between Iran, Croatia and Bosnia for solving the Balkans crisis and expanding economic ties, said such talks should be held every six months in the capital of one of the three states.

Valentic who visited Iran last year for such talks, referred to the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and said the Islamic Republic of Iran relying on its influence on the Muslim people of Bosnia could help further the goals of that federation.

He said minor differences respecting the federation should be left aside and added that to strengthen the federation would be in the mutual interest of both Muslims and Croats. Referring to possible solutions for resolving the crisis in the territories of Croatia occupied by the Serbs he said the policy of Croatia was to ensure the rights of the minority of Serbs consistent with the constitution of Croatia.

Valentic called for solving the problems of the occupied areas by the restoration of those territories to Croatia through peaceful talks.

Prime Minister Nikica Valentic Profiled

95BA0247C Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 May 95 pp 32-33

[Article by Marko Barisic: "A Loner From a Group"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Perhaps in the new conditions in Croatia Valentic would not have been successful if he had not had a political mentor who recommended him to the Croatian leadership: Franjo Greguric was simply crazy about the "boy from Henessy."*

Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic has never liked to watch the television broadcasts of Assembly sessions. It all lasted too long for him, the speakers were usually not concise in their statements, and people often talked only for the sake of talking, without concrete proposals. And when Vboyimir Seks appeared at the podium, the prime minister would usually turn on his cassette player, and the sounds of the Slavonian tambura would resound through his office. Valentic relaxed to the ballads of the Golden Ducats, forgetting about the strenuous morning hours spent in meetings and working consultations; he also pushed into oblivion the difficult meetings over gaining consent from the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] for some crucial laws and decisions from which he did not want to retreat. While the cassette played to the end, Valentic recalled all his decisions on an irrevocable resignation as prime minister. He was surprised that he had never once drafted it and made it public. Perhaps he would have done so, his friends say, if he had not felt a moral responsibility to this job and to the times facing the Croatian state. He was closest to that act last May, when Vboyimir Seks, without consulting him, withdrew bills from the Assembly's agenda in the government's name. Valentic was more sensitive about his personal position than about the political consequences of that action (causing a parliamentary crisis). Vanity began to take effect in him, because, although prime minister, he felt like an instrument of certain circles in the ruling party, powerless to influence the further development of political events. In accordance with his beliefs, he tried to redirect those events, but the center of political power was not close to him.

A Gene for Survival

The only thing that he could do was leave the political scene, or remain somewhere in it where he could try to use his voice and prestige to help give a different character to the direction and orientation of the Croatian state. The recent case of Justice Minister Crnic is actually a mirror of the situation that Valentic is in. He supported Minister Crnic, and in the beginning did not accept his resignation, but in the end, when it became obvious that the faction that considered patriotism to be the main criterion for positions would nevertheless be victorious in the Croatian judicial system, Valentic reconciled himself to the "sacrifice" of that minister. Admittedly, he is still resisting (through the proposal that Olujic replace Vukovic as president of the Supreme Court), but that is no longer even important, because it simply cannot yield any result. Nevertheless, it shows the nature of the prime minister's personality, which does not want to acknowledge a lost battle, and the fact that the Croatian president persuaded him to remain prime minister until the next elections says enough about the quality of his work. Or else perhaps Valentic's remaining is primarily supposed to serve politics, the balance of power within the ruling party, in which it is desirable to retain a few technomanagers in order

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to conceal their actual defeat within the internal party struggle.

It is hard to say whether this will be a defeat for Valentic himself or whether it will be a sort of Pyrrhic victory. If one can judge by his biography, he will think up some new occupation for the new period, or else play some new role, for example in politics, in which he previously did not participate directly. Probably his personal origin (born in Gospic in 1950) also gave him a gene for survival and a thirst for success, which turned into a working energy that, as they say, brought him to his present position. Even while he was studying law, Valentic was a guest speaker on the state radio as a journalist for two years. Many people remember how that tall man, with a slightly highland constitution cultivated by his city upbringing, made his way through news conferences with a big cassette recorder (an Uher, experts on radio equipment would say), seeking interviews that had to have good sound. When he saw that journalism did not exactly bring money and social prestige, however, he turned to his profession. Graduating from the law school, he became the editor of the professional journal PRAVNIK, and then left for an internship at the law office of Dr. Zeljko Jurkovic. After completing his internship, he was employed by the construction industry as the head of the legal service, but because he was not able to eke out an existence in state enterprises, he decided to found the Stanograd housing cooperative. He built about 4,500 apartments (at that time he also built the house he lives in today), and ended up in court, accused of having invested money collected in Zagreb in Cresa, and of having selectively calculated retroactive interest rates for members of the housing cooperative. He was cleared of the charges, and in 1983 opened a law office and dealt mainly with investment and commercial contracts and business law. His experience in that job, in which he also acquired a reputation, was his recommendation for becoming general director of INA in 1990. Of course, he had signed an application form for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] much earlier.

Valentic would not have come to head the largest Croatian firm, however, if he had not had a political mentor who recommended him to the newly elected Croatian leadership. Franjo Greguric, at that time the closest associate of President Tudjman and prime minister in the Government of Democratic Unity, was simply crazy about the "boy from Henessy," the Zagreb cafe in which young businessmen gathered. Mboyen Vedris, Bosiljko Misetic, and Nikica Valentic, ever since their student days, were a trio that, in addition to their common friendship, also achieved successes in their work. Vedris then became president of the city government, Misetic the minister of justice, and Valentic the manager of INA. Today all of them, except for Valentic, have mostly left the ruling state structure, some voluntarily and some because of the balance of power. Only Valentic remained, while still maintaining good relations with them; he was also acceptable to the ruling party, but nevertheless, through his actions, he created a distance that ensured him an independent existence. In this regard the difference between them, which some people noticed even during his student days, became evident. While Vedris was always a bit of a "eager beaver" who also gave instructions in order to earn pocket money, Valentic was more inclined toward gambling. He was interested in big deals and not in small "wages" and political mentors did not have to ensure that he stayed on the top, like Vedris, because even when his mentors became less powerful, Valentic survived.

People Trust Him

Many people attribute his survival as head of the government more to his political skill than to the results he has achieved. We recall how, without a bit of restraint, he promised electricity to Dalmatia within four months. The electricity came, but much later. Recently, he even promised veterans of the homeland war that in one year there would be almost no unemployment at all in Croatia. That promise was given at the same time as the beginning of the restructuring of public enterprises, after which several tens of thousands of workers will be left without jobs. If it were true, Valentic would really become an economic magician, unless he calculated that a large number of Croats would leave for abroad in search of work (from Austria to New Zealand). Economic experts say that things are also similar in the area of the growth of production (which today is only about one-fifth of the prewar level), and not even the transformation and privatization taking place under his government's mandate have yielded the expected results (fresh money and a growth of economic entrepreneurship), and the decline in the standard of living is more than obvious, in spite of the figures presented by his aide Borislav Skegro. Valentic, however, knows how to market his economic policy well in the media. People believe him even when he starts a sentence with "It is not an empty phrase." The foundation of his economic "chest-thumping," however, is controlled inflation and the stable kuna. It seems, however, that the price of his stabilization platform was "paid" by those who already have the least—retirees and workers. It has only now become public that for a long time now two-thirds of the retirees have had pensions of less than 900 kunas, and that the wages of two-thirds of all employed workers are only a little higher. It is precisely toward the former working class

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that Valentic has been ruthless, however. When workers at DIK [lumber company] in Djurdjenovac once blocked a highway because of unpaid wages, Valentic threatened them with the "special police." He was equally harsh toward workers' trade unions, and if the present draft of the new labor law is adopted, the right to strike will be limited and trade union organizations will be mostly left without real power. If there is any improvement in the status of retirees and workers (as has been announced), then it will be because of the upcoming elections, because those two groups are the largest constituencies.

Nevertheless, if the measures of Valentic's government that have brought such consequences allow the Croatian economy to recover in the long term, then some future chronicler will say that it was worth it. There would be more certainty in that respect if Croatian entrepreneurs and business itself were in accordance with the law, and far from politics. The majority would like to believe that, but too many examples show that political power is mainly what is crucial. Where the situation is like that, as shown by examples from other countries, especially Latin American ones, one gains a rich oligarchy and a broad poor class. A direct consequence, in order to maintain that state of affairs and social peace, is the strengthening of the repressive apparatus, which is not good for a Croatia that will possibly have to liberate the occupied areas by military means.

Valentic's Glory

Nevertheless, many people will say, Valentic could not have achieved any more. He made too many concessions to be able to conduct any consistent policy in the end. For the most part, it is gleanings from Markovic's stabilization program, combined with legislation from the developed Western market countries. His most significant steps, they point out, are mainly in the sphere of politics, and not the economy, because through the significant democratization of society and the strategy of establishing ties with European integration trends, a good framework has been created for the future. The agreements with the IMF, the World Bank, the sympathy from our creditors (the rescheduling of debts to the Paris and London Clubs), and the already almost purchased admission to the Council of Europe are a sufficient guarantee that Europe will not establish the border on the Sutla, and instead Croatia will be a vital part of it. When one adds to this Valentic's personal political position, which has been characterized by liberalism, but also the Lika politics of state-building, Croatian citizens can nevertheless be satisfied that he has been their prime minister, and not someone else who would constantly remind them that they have to draw their personal happiness primarily from patriotism. The fact that he will remain prime minister until the next elections and that he will not resign before this year's Statehood Day mostly does not concern them. That is more a matter of the personnel turnover within the ruling structure, which no one knows about after the next elections. He himself will decide whether he will participate in politics on the basis of some new option, or possibly devote himself to his old love, building apartments. Those who know him say that he would like to have an old, run-down house in an unurbanized part of Zagreb, for instance Tresnevci. Valentic's glory will be to tear down an entire quarter of hovels, and on that location create a small city of apartments and offices. For such undertakings, it is necessary to have good ties with politicians. If we were just to look at him personally, Valentic, even as prime minister, was really a successful person—for a lot of Croats, just as much as he was allowed. At the end of his term it would be fair to acknowledge that, even if the sentence began, "It is not an empty phrase."

Article on Parties Awaiting New Elections

95BA0247A Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 May 95 pp 12-13

[Article by Zelimir Zanko: "Parties Await the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *An avalanche of preelection bidding was launched by the biggest opposition party, the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party], at the Zabok meeting of its Grand Council, where the opposition parties were offered a concept of forming coalitions in three groups—left, right, and center.*

An election fever is shaking Croatia again: All of the more important parties have once again presented their electoral concepts, there is no major politician who has not given his view of the future elections, and the leaders' speeches are increasingly adapted to an informal election campaign. All possible coalitions and the electoral chances of the individual parties, measured in percentages of votes, are known down to the most trivial detail; people are discussing both realistic and desirable postelection coalitions. In a manner of speaking, virtually everything is known about the next elections, except for the two most important things: when they will be held, and according to what principle: majority, proportional, or combined.

Firm Opposition Coalition

The avalanche of preelection bidding was apparently launched by the biggest opposition party, the HSLS, at the recent Zabok meeting of its Grand Council, where the opposition parties were offered a new concept for the preelection formation of coalitions, into three

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"ideological" groups—left, right, and center. The most important and strongest opposition bloc would be the one uniting, in addition to the HSLS, the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], HNS [Croatian National Party], and possibly the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] in the center. It is precisely regarding the role of the Manolic-Mesic "genuine HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]" party in such an alliance of centrist parties that there are considerable doubts within the HSLS itself, because some of the liberal leaders consider the HND a not particularly significant partner, which has not developed into a major party and is already showing signs of internal fragmentation, as was seen after the interviews with Mesic and Boljkovac in the Belgrade media.

Not even the HNS favors the HND's participation in a bloc of centrist parties. According to Stijepa Martinovic, the Nationalists could hardly be in a partnership with the HND, as the "genuine HDZ." Of course, the HND sees itself in an alliance with the HNS and the other centrist parties, the HSLS and HSS, and according to some assertions, it is precisely because they know how strong or weak they are that the HND is insisting most on a firm opposition coalition, regardless of the electoral law.

Things are apparently clearer on the right-wing side of the opposition coalition bloc, because the HSP [Croatian Rights Party] plays the leading and almost only role there. Among the rest of the opposition, however, many people, probably also taught by last year's rapid departure of the HSP from the opposition alliance on the occasion of the parliamentary crisis, are not counting too much on the HSP as a reliable partner, maintaining that they would even be more likely to join the HDZ. The HSP's distance from the opposition coalition, judging by the HSP's position, is not far from the truth, because the HSP thinks that there is no one acceptable for a coalition among the Croatian political parties, and so it will probably go into the elections alone. Considering itself strong enough to gain a significant number of seats with any version whatsoever of the electoral law, it is not ruling out a postelection coalition with whoever is politically closest to it.

Confused Left

When one looks at the left side of the opposition spectrum, there is complete confusion.

Tripalo's ASH [Action of Socialists of Croatia] is bitterly insisting upon the unification of left-wing parties, i.e., the SDP [Social Democratic Party] (which it believes has realized the reduced possibility of a coalition with the centrist parties) and the ASH, while also expecting that the HND will be attracted by the number of left-wing voters and that electoral cooperation among the left can also be established with the regional parties, especially the IDS [Istrian Democratic Alliance] and the DA [Dalmatian Action Party]. Only then, in Tripalo's opinion, will it be possible for the left to participate effectively in a large opposition coalition. The SDSP [Social Democratic Renewal Party] has a completely different opinion of unifying the left; Davorin Vidovic is opposed to any sort of ideological linkage whatsoever, and rejects the possibility of participating in a left-wing bloc, while probably seeking a place in the center.

HSS the Most Desirable "Bride"

All of those interesting combinations, which have displayed the current positions of the opposition parties as if under a microscope, depend primarily upon the future electoral law, as all the parties are not forgetting to emphasize. The clearest is the HSS, whose leader Zlatko Tomic has publicly stated the entire Radic campaign tactic several times. If the current electoral law remains, the HSS will join a coalition of centrist parties for the majority part of the elections. If two rounds of voting are introduced, it will act alone for an absolute majority in the first round, while it will form a coalition with the centrist parties in the second one. If fully proportional elections are prescribed, the HSS will go into the elections alone, of course leaving the door open for postelection coalitions.

Predrag Haramija compares the HSS's position with the position of a desirable bride. "In HRVATSKI OBZOR, Zoric talked about the HSLS's cooperation with the HSS, and Canjuga claimed the same thing in VECERNJI LIST. They all want us because of our great influence and stainless reputation." Nevertheless, because of the decentralization of the HSS's party structure, he does not reject the coalition with the HDZ that was already tested in the last elections in certain places, but in local elections.

So far the ruling HDZ has not particularly spoken out about the announced opposition coalitions, except that Zlatko Canjuga stated that the coalitions did not surprise it and that "the HDZ defeated coalitions twice and will do so again." With his already recognizable cautious style he did in fact emphasize to some extent an interest in the HSS, which "the HDZ views as a politically close party." So far he has not said a word about the HDZ's closeness to the HSP, which many observers insist upon. One may believe that such a campaign coalition is impossible for many reasons, primarily because it would have a negative impact upon the public images already created of both parties, and in the end the HSP, if it wanted to, would be much more help to the HDZ, for

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example, with the well-performed role of a Trojan horse in the opposition.

What Kind of Electoral Law?

Everything thus revolves around the new electoral law, which is claimed in the corridors to be in the process of being written secretly by Dr. Smiljko Sokol, a special adviser for legal issues in the Office of the President of the Republic. It allegedly involves a purely proportional electoral system with a high prohibitive clause—it is said that instead of the current 3 percent for entering the Assembly, more—5, 7, or an even higher percentage of votes—would be needed, to which one would have to add an even higher threshold for coalitions. If that is the case, the Assembly picture will change considerably in comparison with the present one, because even the smallest anticipated new threshold, the 5-percent one, can only be satisfied by a few parties, judging by public opinion polls: The HDZ, HSLS, HSS, HSP, and possibly the HND and SDP. The rest that are in the Assembly now would drop out as a result of the electoral law, with the most significant thing being that the losers would also include the most influential regional party, the IDS, which would probably be left with only complete authority in the Istria zupanija. The possibilities that such an electoral law creates for postelection coalitions would be even more interesting. In accordance with the principle of the "best offer," one can imagine virtually all variants of alliances and coalition governments.

Elections After the HDZ Congress?

While everyone is preparing for the elections, it is not yet known when they will really be held, and whether they will be special or regular ones. According to the Constitution, elections are held 60 days at the latest after the expiration of the mandate or the disbanding of the Assembly's chambers, and the chambers can be disbanded if a majority of deputies so decide. According to some interpretations, early elections can be scheduled (in order to be early) by 22 October 1995. According to others, regular elections for the Chamber of Deputies have to be held by 7 November 1996 at the latest. Many opposition parties, in contrast to the HDZ, which claims to be preparing for regular elections in 1996, believe that the elections will be early ones. The HSS thus thinks that because of the internal party elections and the third HDZ Congress, elections cannot be held before late fall. Stipe Mesic assumes that the elections are close, and that "President Tudjman is only waiting for a favorable political moment to schedule them." The HNS believes that next spring is the time planned for the elections; in the present situation the HNS hardly has a chance of remaining a parliamentary party, something that it is feverishly resisting by seeking closer cooperation even with the completely marginal HKDU [Croatian Christian Democratic Union]. By the way, the Croatian Christian Democrats, fragmented into four or five little parties, are awaiting the next elections with particular anxiety, but the leaders' vanity is obviously more important to them than their fear of complete erasure from the political scene—which seems certain—and so not even the well-intentioned effort by the HOR [expansion not given] to unite them was successful. There is no doubt that after this defeat of the little Christian Democratic parties people in the HDZ were rubbing their hands in satisfaction; the HDZ thus, without a lot of effort (if not much attention is paid to partisan insinuations, to efforts to win over prominent members, and to the creation of scandalous incidents, which are common in democratic countries and are also used by all the Croatian parties whenever they can), managed to remain the only Croatian party that has a significant Christian Democratic image, also recognized in international Christian Democratic associations—which may be an important campaign lure. A similar unhappy fate, complete disappearance from the overly rich Croatian party scene, or else a continued gloomy survival on the brink of events, probably also awaits a lot of little para-HSP and right-wing parties, such as the HDSP [Croatian Democratic Rights Party], the HRZ [Croatian Republican Community], the SHDP [Party of Croatian State Rights], and others. Perhaps their solution is close cooperation with the supreme ruler of the right-wing scene, the HSP. Even deeper marginalization also awaits one of the losers of the last elections, deputy Dobroslav Paraga, who heads the institutionally unrecognized HSP. In view of the coming elections and his own minimal chances, it is becoming clearer and clearer to him that he has no other choice but to shout in his own fantastic style: "If necessary, we will all leave all parties and create a joint ballot against the HDZ persecutors while it is still not too late, while they have not completely destroyed Croatia." To the best of our knowledge, so far no one has responded to that call.

[Box, p 13]

What Kind of Supervision of the Elections?

While awaiting the new electoral law as a condition for the creation of firm electoral alliances, the opposition, regardless of the type of the electoral law, is prepared to cooperate closely in monitoring "all elements of the electoral process," as Drazen Budisa said. The observation and monitoring of the elections concern Zlatko Tomcic more than the electoral law. He claims that "It would be wise of the HDZ to sit down with the opposition and agree on how the elections will be observed and monitored." He also announced that

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the opposition would soon present a proposal for the creation of an opposition coordinating group to observe and monitor the elections, which will also propose legal amendments. The negotiations on that commission's work are under way, added P. Haramija, emphasizing that the opposition also has other tactics left, including a boycott of the elections, if those changes regarding election monitoring are not accepted.

[Box, p 13]

Smiljko Sokol: I Am Not Writing a New Electoral Law

Dr. Smiljko Sokol, special adviser for legal issues in the Office of the President of the Republic, denies that he is writing a new electoral law, and says that he has not even received such an assignment. He claims that as things stand now, the existing law, with a combined electoral system, is suitable, because it ensures a stable government, a firm majority for the strongest party, and representation of a broad spectrum of parties in parliament.

Dr. Sokol proposes that two things be changed in the electoral law. The first is the introduction of a rule that a deputy, if he leaves a party or crosses over to another one, has to return his seat to the party on whose list he was elected to the Assembly. In the second place, the prohibitive clause for elections to the Chamber of Deputies should be increased from 3 to 5 percent. The creator of the electoral laws to date would also not recommend introducing a purely proportional system for the next elections, which he claims will not be early ones—or at least will not be held this year. In any case, Sokol says, an electoral law can be written in two hours.

Beginning of HDZ Election Campaign Viewed

95BA0245A Zagreb SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29-30 Apr 95 p 8

[Article by Danko Plevnik: "The Opposition Is Dreaming, Tudjman Is Calling the Shots"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are several elements confirming that the incumbent party is making thorough preparations for an election, elements mainly in the media and the party's internal affairs. The way in which the central news program of HRT [Croatian Radio-TV] covered the celebration of the 5th anniversary of the founding of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] in Gospic, devoting the time slot for the entire news program to the life and deeds of the president of the state as the president of the HDZ, is a textbook example of the way to begin an election campaign. After that the daily news program was reproduced in triplicate, thereby consolidating and strengthening the propaganda infrastructure of HRT and also consolidating the official linkage of the government-controlled media.

That is in any case a much easier job than new elections within the HDZ, which await this party within the next two months. Their purpose is to rescue the reputation of the party within the party itself, which has been largely ruined by events emphasized by its former and present members. The HDZ has been neglecting work within the party, which, according to statements of its leaders, numbers half a million members, the largest capital for an election of any party in Croatia. Without that capital, the HDZ could be reduced to the party apparatus and could approach, say, the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats], whose membership could not guarantee it success in the election. Zlatko Canjuga, chief secretary of the HDZ, explains the neglect of party organization by saying they were preoccupied with organizing the state, while the other parties, which did not have that task, had more time to be concerned with themselves.

HDZ-ization Instead of Europeanization

A majority of the opposition parties reproach the incumbent party for having done more by way of HDZ-ization than Europeanization of the state. There are also reproaches of the HDZ tendency to "unilateralize" recent Croatian political history, attributing all the credit for constituting independent Croatia exclusively to the HDZ, forgetting who, for example, called for the first multiparty elections, and so on.

For that matter, was it not differing "views" of the structure of the Croatian state and its relationship to other states, Bosnia and Herzegovina above all, which caused a rift in the very leadership of the HDZ, which is why there was a split in the party? The party's "floating organization" is correlated to its objectives. In order to bring down communism, Tudjman had to bring together people who were at odds with one another. When he was implementing his Bosnian policy, the "left-wingers" proved to be painful to him, and he dropped them out of his party. If he wants to have a chance for a majority in the next election, Tudjman has to deal with the "right-wingers," which he has attempted to do by a symbolic "sacrifice" of the "technocratic center" represented by Franjo Greguric, in order to suggest the law of dispensability to the right wing as well.

But the right still has a firm hold on party administration and is doing everything to prevent this from happening, fearing a destabilization of Croatia "planned" by the antifascist 70-year-olds.

For that reason Tudjman had to switch to Tito's strategy for keeping himself in power, that is, maintaining the "supreme command" at any price, adjusting the

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personnel needs for tactics and strategy as he goes along. Because the voters have the memory of an elephant and because there are too many people declassed by the war and social conditions, Tudjman will have to sacrifice someone from the "supreme command," and even a unit or two, explaining this away as a justified move to save Croatia. When Canjuga says, "Today the fight for Croatia also means striving for the HDZ," this identification of the HDZ and the state marginalizes the importance to Croatia of the other parties, and indeed of the multiparty system itself. Haven't we already seen that, when after WWII Tito belittled the share of the other parties in creating Federal Croatia, believing only in the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] as the cement of statehood?

If the prestige of the HDZ is to be renewed at the base, in the cities and villages, people who have not been morally sullied have to be found. That is why Tudjman must undertake a peaceful removal of people who have been compromised, doing it as democratically as possible, but we should not expect the right-wing elements to be radically removed from the political scene. Their departure is in proportion to Tudjman's renunciation of authoritarianism, and so the more fundamental that renunciation, the more thoroughly they will be purged from the ranks of party mascots.

While the opposition is staking all its strategies and tactics on some future defeat of the HDZ, the HDZ is announcing a new victory, "buying" Mirko Madjor and Ivica Vrkic during the free agency season, which is more a warning to the opposition than any great gain. That is, political "converts" are of value only within the present free agency rules and the present membership of the parliament, and what their election success will be tomorrow outside the parties that helped them to get into the parliament is an altogether different question. The opposition is counting on the HDZ having so compromised itself on many issues, especially the policy on social welfare and labor, that it simply must fall. But even if we assume that a large segment of the voters do in fact feel that way, this still does not mean that they are ready to vote against the HDZ. The road from sentiment to decision has to be organized, and here the opposition is once again proving itself to be thin and disunited.

Rabbit Ready for the Spit

What is more, some parties are entering the election campaign with none other than the program of the HDZ, which the HDZ "has not carried out," but which "certainly will"!? Some of the opposition parties are thereby recognizing indirectly the force of gravity within the HDZ as the backbone of the future election. The events in the HDZ will also follow their own opposition stratagems in the course of the campaign. And not just because its election experts ("patriots waiting for the call") will once again design rules that are optimal for the political "heroes" of the HDZ. Another advantage of the HDZ is that it need not be the victim of anticipation. The hands of the HDZ are not shaking out of anxiety if it should win, as is the case with the opposition. What is driving the largest opposition parties like the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] is precisely the "HDZ syndrome": to enter the election alone, to win, and to become a "better HDZ," and the "coalition complex": to enter a coalition and lose, or, on the other hand, to share power with a party that got by only "thanks to the coalition with us." The HDZ will perhaps once again offer the opposition a tug-of-war around the spit, but it is preparing the rabbit to satisfy its own appetite.

After all, political economy and the very economics of accommodation are on the side of the incumbent party, which can resolve all quandaries through centralism, in a jiffy at that, while in the discussions that precede agreement in the opposition there are always false charismas, exaggeration of one's own personnel, neglect of the smaller parties, and a relative absence of a feel for strategy. The HDZ had a clear principle—remove the "communards" from power, but also the civic courage to accept into its ranks 70,000 former members of the League of Communists of Croatia! The question is whether the opposition has such a clear desire to remove from power the "HDZ-ites" when the main opposition parties, like the HSLS, HSS, and HNS [Croatian People's Party] are renouncing ties with the HND and SDP [Social Democratic Party]? The HDZ is still leading the dance, and its activity to think up postelection coalitions with a particular party or to drive a wedge into the present coalitions against the HDZ and so on will depend on the course of the new election campaign, the war, and the postwar period....

Poll Report on Living Conditions in Croatia

95BA0243A Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 95 p 29

[Article by Zelimir Zanko: "How Is Life in Croatia? Tolerable—Because of the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The economic situation of Croatia's citizens is middling, neither good nor bad, which, when the war is taken into account, is by and large tolerable. Along with the belief that the Croatian economy will recover, citizens of Croatia mostly think that even now life in Croatia is better than in the

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former European socialist states. That would be the briefest evaluation of the answers of 450 respondents from all Croatian zupanijas in the HRVATSKI OBZOR survey (conducted 18-19 April) in which they were asked to evaluate their present economic condition, to state their belief as to the recovery of the Croatian economy, and to evaluate the quality of life in view of the war, and compare their quality of life to that in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe.

Economic Condition "Good"—24.4 Percent

Thus, in answer to the first question, more than one-fourth, 28 percent of the respondents, did not give their economic condition a bad grade: "Good" said no fewer than 24.4 percent, and 3.6 percent said "very good." Slightly more, 28.5 percent of the total sample, said they could not boast about their economic condition, and 19.8 percent gave it a grade of "bad," while 8.7 percent said "very bad." It is "neither bad nor good" for 41.3 percent.

These overall assessments of the economic situation of the population, with which the government can be relatively happy, because they do not indicate that a possible "social bomb" will be set to go off in the near future, can be analyzed more precisely when we take into account that the assessments obtained in the regional samples nevertheless indicate deviations from the Croatian average that cannot be overlooked.

For example, 33.4 percent of the respondents in the Zagreb region, 30.6 percent in Slavonia, 30.5 percent in Istria, Rijeka, and Lika, and only 18.8 percent in Dalmatia consider their situation "very good" or "good." The following assessments are in line with this: 34.3 percent of respondents in Zagreb, 40.6 percent in Slavonia, 45.8 percent in Istria, Rijeka, and Lika, and 44.7 percent of those in Dalmatia consider their situation "neither good nor bad." Finally, the negative assessments by region also depart quite a bit from the average: The most dissatisfied are in Dalmatia, where 36.5 percent of the respondents consider their situation "bad" or "very bad," while this group was 28.5 percent in Slavonia, 32.2 percent in Zagreb, and 23.7 percent in Istria, Rijeka, and Lika. It should also be said that displaced persons and other serious victims of the war, whose assessments would certainly have reduced somewhat the overall satisfaction of citizens with their economic situation, were not included in the evaluation of present economic perceptions.

The answers to the next question prove that these assessments of people's economic situations depend quite a bit on the impact of the circumstances of the war on life in general, which points up the patience of individuals. Most of the respondents, 57.8 percent, judge that they are living "tolerably" when the war in Croatia is taken into account. Considerably fewer, 22.9 percent, find that life is "barely tolerable," and 11.8 percent "good," while the smallest group, 4.6 percent, judge life in Croatia to be "intolerable."

Belief in Economic Recovery

A still greater agreement of the respondents, indicating belief in the future economic moves of the government, was evident in the third question: More than three-fourths of the respondents, 78.7 percent, believe in the Croatian economy's recovery, while 15.8 percent do not believe in it.

Belief in the vitality of the Croatian economy, which was probably influenced quite a bit by patriotic emotions, but also by sources of information (the media), is indicated by answers to the question in which life in Croatia is compared with that in the postcommunist European countries, according to available information. More than half, 55.8 percent, believe that "life is better in Croatia," while only 12 percent think that "people are living better in the former socialist states." Slightly more of the respondents (15.1 percent) believe that life is "the same" in Croatia and the former socialist countries. Here again it is quite important in this comparison that the respondents believe that the war is generally influencing the quality of life and Croatia's opportunities for development, because a high majority, 90.7 percent, of those who believe that life is better in the former socialist countries answered affirmatively the question "Do you think that life would be better in Croatia than in the former socialist countries if it were not for the war?" At the same time, very few, 3.6 percent, of these respondents say that they would be living worse than in the former socialist countries if it were not for the war in Croatia.

Hrvoje Kacic on Croatian Plans for Prevlaka

95BA0226D Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Apr 95 p 11

[Interview with Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, chairman of the State Commission for the Border of the Republic of Croatia, by Luko Brailo; place and date not given: "We Want Nudists on Prevlaka Instead of Young Men in Armor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia agrees with Montenegrin President Bulatovic's request that "Montenegro enjoy free access to Boka Kotorska," but yachts and commercial vessels can sail in innocent passage through all parts of the sea, but warships can only go through their half of the entrance to Boka. Croatia will advocate that tourists, sailors, nudists come to the area of Prevlaka's

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interior bay.. that is better than having young men in armor keep watch there.

[Brailo] How would you comment on the recent Herzegovina meeting between Yasushi Akashi and Momir Bulatovic on settling the problem of Prevlaka, and in connection with this, Bulatovic's emphatic readiness to have those problems between Croatia and Montenegro settled peacefully and diplomatically?

[Kacic] It is understandable that on the occasion of that meeting Prevlaka was the center of attention. On that occasion, Bulatovic stated that he hoped that the work of the intergovernmental commission would be revived soon, with a somewhat higher level of political responsibility, and that the people who were members of that commission would contribute to eliminating the fears and apprehensions on both sides. That statement by Bulatovic, however, represents a certain turnabout in comparison with what we previously heard from our southern neighbors. Bulatovic is thus returning to the starting point regarding recognition of Croatia's territorial integrity, which was initiated by the Montenegrin Assembly almost three and a half years ago. Nevertheless, we should recall that the same Bulatovic explained at the end of 1993 that "The area of Prevlaka, as a microquality, includes Vitaljina, Molunat, and Popovice." That is ordinary stupidity, and Bulatovic realized that he would be sending his young people to die again. What has happened in the meantime is well known, and both Podgorica and Belgrade have experienced having their hordes of aggressors, murderers, and robbers expelled from the entire Dubrovnik area and from all of Konavale.

[Brailo] Is the Herzegovina meeting, at the same time, a sign that they have finally given up on the idea of an exchange of certain territories (the so-called triple exchange) in order for the eastern Herzegovina and Bosnian Serbs to get "access to the sea" through Konavale?

[Kacic] That kind of scheme has not yet disappeared in certain circles. In particular, it is constantly encouraged by Karadzic and Vucurevic, but they only understand force of arms. Certainly those schemes are also being encouraged by Belgrade, and we must not fall into that trap, because among other things, that would complicate relations with Sarajevo even more. Your question is appropriate, but for the sake of clarity, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro, i.e., the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], are in a "triangle." As far as the "access to the sea" through Konovale is concerned, without all of Konavale there is no intact Dubrovnik, and thus no integral Croatia. The mistakes made by Pavelic in 1941 with the notorious "Rome Treaty" must not be repeated. With respect to "access to the sea" for the eastern Herzegovina Serbs, the historical facts dictate an answer. Specifically, it should be ceded to them by Montenegro—from Grab through Krusevica, Mojdeza, and Sutorina, i.e., where they historically had it for centuries, and the area which Djuro Pucar and Avdo Humo, by agreement with Blazo Jovanovic, exchanged for the areas below Maglic Mountain east of Sutjeska.

"Better a Court Than War"

[Brailo] Let's go back to the meeting in Herceg Novi again. Among other things, Bulatovic expressed hope that "the negotiations on Prevlaka and restoring peace in the Herceg Novi-Dubrovnik region would proceed faster than the negotiations on the normalization of FRY-Croatian relations."

[Kacic] In that part, Bulatovic may believe that he now sincerely wants that. The extent to which he has ceased to be Milosevic's dependent and servant remains an open question, however. Montenegro is beginning to realize that without a normalization of relations with Croatia, it has no prospects at all for development, and not just with respect to tourism. In order to achieve that, however, the noose and the vise imposed on them by Belgrade have to be released.

[Brailo] With that change in the Montenegrin leadership's position and the support for a diplomatic and peaceful solution, weapons are being mentioned less and less. It is noticeable that their experts on international law are suggesting arbitration, and not warfare.

[Kacic] That is becoming obvious, and Prof. Nebojsa B. Vucinic of Podgorica recently told MONITOR that "a court is better than war." I agree with Prof. Vucinic on that. Croatia is prepared to bring border issues—in accordance with the positions adopted to date by the Badinter Commission and numerous UN Security Council resolutions—like establishing the border at sea, before the International Court of Justice in The Hague or before an agreed-upon ad hoc arbitration committee, or even before the Badinter Commission. Croatia has no reason not to agree with Bulatovic's request that "Montenegro enjoy free access to Boka Kotorska." In that regard, however, one only has to keep in mind that yachts and other commercial vessels can sail in innocent passage through all parts of the sea, but warships can only do so through their half of the entrance to Boka Kotorska. Croatia will advocate having tourists, sailors, and, if you wish, even nudists come to the area of Prevlaka's interior bay. That is certainly better than having young men keep watch there in armored vests.

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[Brailo] You otherwise have an interesting view of the regime for those so frequently mentioned areas at the entrance to Boka Kotorska.

[Kacic] Why not construct a memorial museum to the prisoners and victims of the Italian occupation, for example, in the old fortress on the little island of Mamula? Likewise, we could open a memorial museum to the victims of World War I and II, and to our heros of this Homeland War, in the old Austrian fortress on the Ostro Cape. Room could certainly be found there for the more than 300 people from Konavale and Dubrovnik who were forced in November 1944 to rush for days through mine fields toward Ledenice and Risan in Boka. As the Knin Serb Obrad Egic, who was then the commander of the Second Dalmatian Brigade, testified, those were "fighters who had not previously participated in minor actions and acquired combat habits, but who were instead thrown right from their homes, without experience, into the very front line." That vile crime was also for the purpose of so-called ethnic cleansing, because the closest German Army formations were then hundreds of kilometers away from Boka Kotorska.

Force and Deception

[Brailo] There are blue [UN] observers on Prevlaka. The latest UN resolution is going to be elaborated soon; how do you expect the world peacekeeping organization to treat that area? As in the past, or something broader?

[Kacic] First of all, we should recall that the Yugoslav troops withdrew from the very barracks on Ostro Cape on the basis of the Vance Plan and the joint statement by Presidents Tudjman and Cosic on 30 September 1992, which explicitly stated that the UN would send observers to Ostro Cape itself. That statement, however, also said that a solution for the general security of Boka Kotorska and Dubrovnik would be found through negotiations. Nevertheless, nothing has been accomplished in that direction for more than two years, because the so-called FRY threatened armed action. That job still awaits us. Unfortunately, we have to be ready to prevent any surprise. Belgrade's logic is still conquest—either by force, or by deception. So far the UN has neglected any active involvement to implement the abovementioned agreement by Presidents Tudjman and Cosic about the general security of Dubrovnik and Boka Kotorska. One must hope that what has been neglected so far will be compensated for in the near future. Yasushi Akashi has been made aware of that, and probably his recent stroll through Stradun will help to keep him from forgetting that obligation. He will now receive direct instructions to that effect from the UN Security Council.

[Brailo] In talking about Prevlaka, we are actually also talking about Dubrovnik and all the Croatian areas that have experienced aggression, and about the international community's efforts finally to establish peace. In connection with that, how do you interpret the statements in the memorandum from Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to the FRY (1989-92), who, among other things, is now stating that the Western countries and NATO neglected to act more decisively to stop the conflict back in 1991, during the attacks upon Vukovar and Dubrovnik? What use are these subsequently uttered views, especially for the victims of aggression? Isn't that one more proof that Europe did not know how to respond to the aggressor at the right time, while the United States lagged behind with its policy, and so now everything is much harder to resolve?

[Kacic] Having gotten into the subject of Zimmerman's memoirs, it is interesting to make our public aware of how he describes Milosevic as a person who tolerates, encourages, and even organizes the indescribable atrocities committed by the Serbs. Because, in effect, the United States has remained the only world power since that period, the question that arises on its own is why and how that sole great power is forcing Croatia to find a solution acceptable to all sides at the same table with war criminals. We are not comforted by the confessions of leading world politicians and statesmen who, in direct contacts and even publicly, confess their mistakes and omissions in halting the aggression and the terrible violence and genocide. It is another mistake today to ignore the fact that the chief director of those atrocities, Milosevic, whom the world press has described for a long time as the "Balkan butcher," is being treated like a peacemaker.

Origins of the West's Collapse

[Brailo] That same international community, however, is still seeking to negotiate with that "peacemaker" and others like him.

[Kacic] The United States and all the European states of Western civilization cannot give their publics and the world an answer as to why, in 1991, Kuwait was not forced to find a solution through negotiations with Iraqi President Saddam. Different standards are being applied to Croatia. Even if one accepts that they could not do it in 1991, then they should have done it in January 1992, or at the latest in April 1992, when Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted to the UN as full members of the international community. By that fact, the United States, the European Union, and the UN acquired not only the right, but also the obligation to apply the fresh example of Iraq here as well. I am afraid that those experiences, at the same time, not only mean the beginning of an erosion of the legitimacy of the fundamental institutions of the international community,

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but also contain the origins of the collapse of Western civilization.

[Brailo] Can one equate the victim and the aggressor?

[Kacic] People imbued with the consumer mentality can, because within the framework of their perceptions, they become indifferent toward the future of Europe and the world. Statesmen who have to know that responsibility exists along with their armchairs, however, cannot!

Difficult Situation of Croats in FRY Examined

95BA0226B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Apr 95 p 12

[Article by Gojko Boric: "Noncitizens Also Without Real Estate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *If some new draft Republic of Serbia laws are adopted, many of the Croats there will be deprived of their "Yugoslav" citizenship, and thus the right to own real estate. That is a roundabout method for the Serbian authorities to accomplish even more ethnic cleansing of nationally mixed areas.*

Koln—During his trip through Germany, Bela Tonkovic, president of the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina, gave a lecture in Koln about the situation that Croats in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Boka Kotorska were in. His organization has about 9,000 members. It was founded in 1990, but today it would certainly not receive a permit to operate. The Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina wants to establish a Croatian National Council for all Croats in the area of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

According to the Catholic Church's data, about 160,000 Croats live in Vojvodina, but according to the 1991 population census, there were only 74,000 of them. The abandonment of their homes for hundreds of years occurred mainly under pressure extending from murders and kidnappings to telephone terror and the abuse of children in schools.

Similar conditions exist in Kosovo and Boka Kotorska. Of the 15,000 Croats that were in Montenegro, about 6,000 have emigrated. The Croats in Kosovo are between the Serbian hammer and the Albanian anvil. Not only the Serbs but also the Albanians are trying to push the Croats out of the villages in which they have lived for centuries. The Croats do not even have the right to hear mass in their own language, because Albanian Bishop Prela does not want to deliver sermons in Croatian, even though he studied in Zagreb and knows Croatian well.

The Croats in Vojvodina decided that they would no longer be satisfied with "folklore Croatianism," and that they wanted to take power into their own hands in accordance with democratic principles. In Subotica they are in power together with the Hungarians, with whom there is cordial and equal cooperation throughout Vojvodina.

The relationship with the provincial and federal authorities is nothing more than pointless talks in which the Serbs try to avoid responding to any specific complaints. If the new draft Republic of Serbia laws on citizenship and real estate are adopted, the position of the Croats in Serbia will be even more difficult. "Yugoslav" citizenship will be taken away from many people, and they will thus lose the right to own real estate. That is a roundabout method for the Serbian authorities to accomplish even more "ethnic cleansing" of nationally mixed areas.

A particular problem for the Croats in Serbia is the forced mobilization of young people. Many of them fled from Serbia to avoid being involved in a war against members of their own people. They also have the right to do so according to the UN regulations that ban mobilization for civil wars. The Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina is in constant contact with several international organizations, from the UN, through the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], to the European Parliament. All those institutions are receiving accurate information about the position of Croats in Serbia. At one time the Croats were wealthy landowners, but today they are living in great poverty. First they are fired from their jobs, and then getting another job is out of the question. They have been ejected from the administration, the judicial system, and the police.

The Croats in Vojvodina, however, are trying to preserve their national identity as much as possible, even though the Serbian authorities have administratively divided them into Backa Croats, Sokci and Croats. They founded the Croatian Publishing Company [HID], which will issue all the publicity material that the Croats need. Croatian children from Vojvodina are partly educated in Zagreb as well. Unfortunately, when they return to their towns they are exposed to mistreatment by the Serbian militia, which has even forced some of them to spy against their own people. Bela Tonkovic said that some incidents might happen, because those children are sometimes at the limit of their endurance.

The prospects of the Croats in Vojvodina lie in economic ties with Croatia. When the war is over and economic and political relations are established between Croatia and Serbia, obviously the Vojvodina Croats, who have the knowledge and will for that, should profit from it.

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Article: Population of Krajina Impoverished

95BA0238D Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 95 p 33

[Unattributed article: "'Krajina's' Spending Limited to 40 German Marks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 10 days ago, when yet another orchestrated "happening of the people" resounded on the main square of Knin, organized by trade unionists there, the bigwigs in Knin promised for the umpteenth time prosperity, improvement of the standard of living, and the complete well-being of the self-proclaimed Serbian quasi-state... "as soon as the danger of war is eliminated, and the conspiracy of the international community is abandoned," of course.

Martic: Potatoes for Everyone!

With this well-known vocabulary the Knin leaders attempted once again to redirect the frustrations of the impoverished population, to homogenize the hungry "chosen people" and direct it toward its enemies—"the whole world." The slogans about the right to self-determination, accompanied by war drums, are pushed into the background by Knin's urgent problem—the economic collapse and the utter impoverishment of the self-proclaimed "krajina."

What is life really like in the occupied regions of Croatia, what is the condition of industry there, and is there any at all?

Milosevic's thesis "that the Serbs will eat roots if necessary" was supplemented early this year by Martic in the optimistic paraphrase that "no one will go hungry, because there are potatoes and lamb for everyone." But is that really the case?

The army and police are the most numerous groups among those that have some kind of occasional income. The armed groupings, which along with the reserves do not exceed 35,000 people at the maximum, can be included among the rare "fortunate ones" whose monthly pay is no more than three months late. After them come just a few thousand persons employed in service activities and workers in the small and virtually symbolic industry. TVIK [screw factory] in Knin, Borovo in Borovo, and the officials of public firms, along with those already listed, represent only slightly less than 25 percent of the total population of people who are living at the moment in occupied regions of Croatia. If we add to this the group of retired people and the local population who work for the United Nations, we get a clearer idea of how large (or small) is the stratum of people with some kind of guaranteed income.

So, the average pay, according to the Knin media, is about 100 Yugoslav dinars. Converted to German marks [DM], the currency that is nevertheless more official than the one that is official, the average pay is hardly more than DM40. When we take into account hyperinflation, when the mark on the black market began to rise even as much as 50 percent per week, the picture is clearer to some extent. The Serbian quasi-state in Croatia is being supplied to a minor extent by the government firms, and the private entrepreneurs are inevitable. Aside from the most basic needs of life, Martic's firms are unable to furnish hardly anything else, which makes this an ideal space for "private entrepreneurs," that is, smugglers, whose activity has been completely legalized in Knin in recent years. The route taken by the supply of goods, mainly of Serbian origin, was well known even earlier, but recently it has been undergoing changes. Because of escalation of the war in northern Bosnia and around the Posavina corridor, but also because of the newly established customs clearance of the goods of the Bosnian Serbs, the Serbs are making ever greater use of another route that was made possible by the economic agreement: Lipovac and Bosanska Gradiska, and from there goods enter Croatian territory once again: Banija, Kordun, Lika, and the hinterland of northern Dalmatia.

Baranja Is Doubled Over in Misery

The economic agreement and the opening of the limited-access highway through the former Sector West of the UNPA [UN Protected Area] has also considerably improved supply to Baranja and eastern Slavonia, occupied at the moment, and Okucani, but also the fringe areas of Banija and Kordun.

But in spite of the improved supply, the purchasing power of the rebel Serbs is extremely small. An average earning of some DM40 is hardly sufficient for basic needs—flour, oil, sugar, and salt. People buy only what can be produced in peasant households. A box of Morava cigarettes made in Nis or a bottle of beer from Banja Luka costs DM1, which best reflects the standard of living of the rebellious Croatian Serbs. Only those who have money go into the few restaurants that exist.

"People are living miserably," the cameras were recently told in the Split Hospital by a Serbian soldier who was wounded and captured. "The small group of people who have money live very well, but most of the people are on the verge of starvation." That sentence perfectly reflects the true state of affairs in the self-proclaimed krajina. Almost 100,000 people in the "krajina" have fled to Serbia, and at the moment only those close to the political elite live well, or those who have secured an altogether decent existence through smuggling and

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thievery, while the great majority are going hungry. Once fertile Baranja is today convulsing in misery and poverty, and the former progenitors of armed rebellion and Serbian secession are today living in Belgrade in luxury apartments.

That things are "creaking" at every step is quite certain, as evidenced primarily by the Knin media, but also by members of the United Nations. The increasingly numerous arrivals of Serbs "shopping" in the free part of Croatia suggests that reintegration is beginning. Economic reintegration. It's a start.

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Private Stations Request Temporary Frequencies

AU2405183895 Skopje MIC in English 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the middle of the action of closing down more than 40 private RTV stations (out of a total of 250) in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the steering committee of the association of private RTV stations asked the Minister of Traffic Dimitar Buzlevski yesterday to give them a period of six months to get adapted to the new working conditions.

Pending the adoption of the new Law for radio-diffusion, the private RTV stations asked to be given temporary frequencies, that the ownership of the technical equipment be clearly defined, and that the RTV stations be listed in the court register.

The talks between the steering committee and the ministry will continue in order to settle the problems in the radio-diffusion and to bring down the number of stations to a realistic level, on a legal basis.

Albanian Journalists Oppose TV Editor's Removal

AU2405171895 Skopje MIC in English 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Unofficial information concerning changes in the editorial staff of the program in Albanian language of the Macedonian Television [MTV] proved to be true yesterday. With a decision of the MTV management, the editor-in-chief Skender Raufi was dismissed from this function and replaced again by Hisen Sakjiri, who carried out this function for nine years, before Raufi's appointment three years ago.

The reappointment of Shakjiri as editor-in-chief of the programs in Albanian language at MTV aroused considerable public interest, especially among journalists and other employees in this editorial office, i.e. they refuse to accept the arbitrary appointment of Sakjiri to this function and to work under him.

On the trail of this news, we spoke with the editor-in-chief of the political program on MTV Zoran Ivanov, who confirmed this news. "The organization inside the house is an internal question of MTV. We're not leading politics here, we're not electing ministers, nor a government. There are 20 to 25 employees in this editorial office, and one of them is the new editor. Maybe Hisen Sakjiri is the man who can suit the criteria of the new organization of the house, at this moment. The Albanian program has been extended three hours, and that hasn't been used up enough. In the three months, which is how long I've been to this function, a couple of editors have been changed," said Ivanov.

The new editor-in-chief said he did not have anything to state as he was appointed to this function by the management.

The journalists from this program are refusing to accept these staff changes, and taking the issue a step further, yesterday, they sent a letter to the management. As Skender Raufi told us, following the appointment of Hisen Shakjiri, "the editorial office is refusing to work any further, as Hisen was unanimously dismissed from this function three years ago, which he carried out nine years and now, in a totalitarian way and a clean-cut case of putsch, he is coming back to the function. Both then and now, the office is prepared to suggest its own candidate to this function (and that is its indisputable right). The letter is signed by 22 journalists from the Albanian editorial office," Skender said.

That the issue of the changing of the editor-in-chief of the Albanian editorial office at MTV is not an internal matter of the house alone, but also of the public, is also illustrated by the involvement and efforts of the Albanian political subject in relation to this question. Official sources say that the latest staff changes at MTV were discussed yesterday at highest state level. Unofficially, however, PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] supports the stance of the journalists at the Albanian editorial office, to chose their editor-in-chief themselves.

Colonel Discusses New Military Academy

AU2405180995 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 May 95 p 2

[Interview with Army Colonel Stojce Deskovski, head of the Institute for Education of Army Officers, by Zoran Petrov; place and date not given: "The Most Rational Model: Our Own Military Academy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As soon as the Army of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was constituted, an Educational Department was formed within the General Staff for military education matters. It was indispensable not only for the simple education of officers in the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia] but also for completing the education of nearly 600 cadets and students of military academies in Macedonia from the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], who, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, did not have anywhere to finish their studies. Two courses of three and six months each were organized in July 1992 for cadets in military academies whose education had been interrupted in the fourth year, while the training of other cadets started in March 1992 and is still in progress. The old department was renamed the Institute for the Education of

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Army Officers and is located in the "Goce Delcev" barracks in Skopje. Actually, according to the bill on the military academies that will probably be debated in parliament this week, a higher educational institution will replace the Institute. We discussed the military academy and the development of the project with Colonel Stojce Deskovski, the head of the Institute for the Education of Army Officers.

Conflict of Two Concepts

[Petrov] Why a military academy?

[Deskovski] It was simply indispensable after the formation of our own army. At first, our obligation was to provide for the completion of the education of Macedonian cadets, and then came the need for the training of army officers. One of the ideas for the education of ARM officers was to create a military academy as a higher educational, scientific, and research institute, which would develop and integrate the entirety of military education. In October 1992, we completed a draft on the formation of a military academy, and in December of the same year we prepared the first bill. There was a lot of resistance to the concept of a military academy, mainly in negative and quite unsubstantiated articles in the media. In July of 1993, we resumed work on a new legal text, which was accepted by the government at the beginning of 1994, and, that July, it was on the agenda of the 78th session of parliament that never took place. The bill on a military academy has been now returned to parliament and—I have been informed—it will be discussed at the next session. I personally believe that it will be passed.

[Petrov] You mentioned some resistance to your concept and, as far as we remember, the resistance came not from the media but from the old Faculty of Total National Defense, which favored the education of army officers at the existing Institute for Defense. Is this correct?

[Deskovski] Yes, it is correct. The Institute for Defense had its own concept, which was that the education of army officers should be carried out by the "two plus two" model, that is that the first two years should be carried out at the Faculty of Philosophy, and the last two in the military education system of the Army—that is: the military academy. This model was offered as a temporary solution in the period after the formation of the ARM, when there were no other proposals.

My opinion about educating army officers at civilian faculties is based on the experiences of other countries. I do not know of any civilian faculty in the world where army officers are educated. Namely, particular conditions are necessary for the education of army personnel, such as teaching staff in many military disciplines, and using specific equipment, boarding houses and military organization for the cadets so as to enable them to command Army units, and so on. There are no such conditions at civilian faculties.

[Petrov] How much does the education of an army officer cost at the military academy? Do you have any information in this sphere?

[Deskovski] Education at our own military academy is the most rational and the cheapest way for producing army personnel for our own army. According to some analyses, the price of education per cadet is about $10,000 for the four years. This price is 25 percent less because of the year of military service. According to some information, such education abroad is six times more expensive.

Education by NATO Standards

[Petrov] What are the teaching and material conditions. That is: What teaching personnel, curricula, and programs do you have?

[Deskovski] In the "Goce Delcev" barracks there is a sufficient number of facilties and rooms that have been adapted into classes, offices, laboratories, libraries, and so on. There are sport grounds as well, but the Academy will use the firing ranges and military equipment of the ARM. At this moment, there are five doctors of science in our Institution, a number of masters of arts or officers who have graduated at the Command Staff Academy. Additional personnel from the ARM and the Ministry of Defense, as well as professors from faculties, will be engaged. The curricula and programs will be adapted to our educational goals and tasks. In the preparation of the curricula and programs we shall be using our own experiences and the experiences of other countries—members of NATO, with which we have established direct contact. Social, scientific, mathematical, military technical, general military, as well as professional and specialized subjects, will be studied, and the total number of hours will correspond to military academies in the world.

[Petrov] Regarding your statement on using the experiences of NATO members, can you tell us whether any NATO programs and standards will also be applied at the military academy and how?

[Deskovski] Our country has clearly expressed its will to join the "Partnership for Peace" initiative and a collective defense system such as NATO. The application of NATO standards in the education of our staff is indispensable if we want to join this collective defense system. Actually, this question is a special subject that

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deserves thorough and detailed treatment. I will say here only that the curricula and programs that are conceptualized by the models of NATO countries will provide our officers with a modern and good education that will enable them to continue education at high military academies in these countries.

[Petrov] Will the military academy only serve for the education of infantry commanders or also for the Air Force and Air Defense, as they are also included in the bill on defense?

[Deskovski] According to the bill, undergraduate and postgraduate studies for infantry commanders will be organized at the military academy. Undergraduate studies will be organized for infantrymen, but there are no limits on other activities of the academy. There are activities and services that can be provided by infantrymen for the Air Force and Air Defense units. This means that personnel of these services will also be educated in the military academy, apart from pilot training.

[Petrov] If the law on the military academy is passed, does it mean that this year you will be organizing an entrance examination for cadets and is there a concept and criteria for this?

[Deskovski] After the law on the military academy is passed, there will be an entrance examination for cadets for the first academic year. The examination has been prepared and will include conditions and criteria that have to be met by the candidates. According to the law, these are as follows: Candidates must be citizens of the Republic of Macedonia with completed secondary education, under 22, and in good physical and psychological condition, to be confirmed by a military medical commission. The criteria will be based on the success that they have achieved at high school and in the entrance examination, which will include mathematics and a test of candidates' physical abilities.

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Minister Addresses Sejm on Foreign Policy Priorities

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[Speech by Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski to the Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: I would like to talk about the Third Republic using the words of Pericles, in the way those words were reported by Thucydides in the "Peloponnesian War": In our state life we are guided by the principle of freedom; in our private life we are guided by tolerance; and in public life we respect laws. We obey the authorities and laws of the day, particularly the unwritten ones, which defend those who have been wronged because transgression of these laws results in universal shame.

A country's foreign policy understood in this way should combine clearly defined priorities and consistent implementation of them with respect for fundamental ethical values. It should be effective. It should be based on the principles of openness and diversity. It should be considerate and farsighted, looking into the future.

Our priorities have remained unchanged since the historic breakthrough in 1989. We want to bring about integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the European Union as soon as possible, build good friendly relations with all of our neighbors, continue to participate actively in regional cooperation, and intensively develop economic relations with dynamic world markets.

We treat these priorities as equally important and mutually supportive of one another. Significant progress in one area is not possible without progress in other areas. We treat NATO, the European Union, and the Western European Union as a system integrating the Euro-Atlantic community. We do not see any contradiction between our will to integrate with the West and the building of friendly relations with the states located east of our borders. Activities in both directions are closely linked.

We regard regional cooperation as an indispensable form of extending bilateral cooperation. Any further success of our reformed economy without continuous consolidation of Poland's position on world markets would be impossible.

May it please the House: In the sixth year of the Third Republic we note a steady progress in fulfilling our aims. A real debate is taking place within NATO on the subject of its extension. In this debate Poland is being mentioned as one of the first candidates for full membership.

We have signed and are effectively implementing an association agreement with the EU. We have the status of an associated partner with the WEU. We have established a free trade zone in Central Europe. Economic cooperation with the East has expanded. This is mainly thanks to the persistent efforts of Polish diplomats. Their effectiveness, however, is possible only because the fundamental aims of Poland's foreign policy have been supported by all significant political forces in the country. This consensus is our great national value.

The lasting orientation of Polish foreign policy was clearly defined in the address delivered by Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy to the esteemed house on 3 March this year. This policy has been represented consistently by President Lech Walesa for more than four years now.

May it please the House: The world after the Cold War is not a peaceful place. We are particularly concerned about political instability and the economic crisis that is dragging on east of our borders. Russia's constant opposition against the plans to extend NATO arouses concern that the policy of division of influence may return.

Conflicts that brought about the collapse of the Yugoslav state have proved that ethnic and religious animosities have not yet ceased to exist in Europe. The Balkan tragedy has also proved that cooperation of the international community is still not entirely effective.

Moreover, threats of a new type have been growing, such as organized crime, smuggling of drugs and radioactive materials, and the degradation of natural environment.

In order to stand up to these threats and challenges we must respect the principles of sovereignty, partnership in international relations, and human rights. It is imperative to remain faithful to these fundamental values and principles. The world order should be organized according to them. Only a world that is organized according to these principles will be able to ensure true security for all countries.

May it please the House: A concern about state security calls for a farsighted attitude and for actions which would preempt potential crises and prevent their occurrence. For this reason it is our objective to achieve membership in NATO's integrated political and military structure as soon as possible. It is a system which has been tested, both as far as its prodemocratic intentions and its military effectiveness are concerned.

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We fully accept the values expressed in the preamble of the Washington Treaty. We want to provide our contribution to the construction of the world based on democratic principles, respect for law, and defense of common heritage.

We are convinced that the process of expanding the alliance eastward will increase political stability and opportunities for developing democracy and market economy on the entire territory of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] countries. Our NATO membership would not be directed against any state. On the contrary, it would serve general European stability and security and would result in eliminating the grey zone in Central Europe.

I would like to stress very strongly that the reason for setting up NATO was defense and not aggression. It is an organization friendly to countries that are building democracy. There is no other system that has been tested better and that would be more effective as a defense system to protect the family of democratic states. The gradual acceptance of new Central European countries as members will reiterate the correctness and lasting nature of transformation adopted by these countries.

We participate actively in the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program. We will make efforts to extend the network of Poland's links with NATO and to utilize in the best possible way both forms of cooperation in order to prepare our military and civilian structures for membership of this organization. As a result of our actions, we are now among the most active countries, and partners of NATO. We value highly the achievements of the Partnership for Peace initiative so far: joint military exercises, including the Cooperation Bridge in 1994 on Polish territory; the overcoming of psychological barriers; and the establishment of personal contacts.

The cooperation between Polish Sejm and the North Atlantic Assembly is developing intensively as well. Our representatives take part in the consultations of the NATO Political Committee. The consolidation and development of Poland's bilateral relations with NATO countries occupy an important position among our activities.

We have been following closely internal studies undertaken by the alliance on forms of NATO expansion and the consequences of such expansion, which were initiated officially in January this year. We are expecting a discussion on these studies with the interested countries. We are making intensive organizational and substantive preparations to our participation in this debate, and we expect to be invited to take part in autumn. We are strengthening the diplomatic and military structures responsible for the implementation of contacts with NATO. We are extending our liaison office attached to the NATO Headquarters, as well as the appropriate sections in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We are already searching for answers to questions that will emerge during the debate on the expansion of the alliance. They will concern defense policy and issues connected with its implementation, readiness to fulfil the obligations resulting from the Washington Treaty, and our ability to strengthen the alliance.

We must work out the answers to the questions on how to achieve political, organizational, military, and interoperational compatibility with NATO, as well as questions concerning our position on many specific issues that may emerge when we join the NATO military structures. We are approaching our future NATO membership taking into account both our own security needs, the technical and financial capabilities, as well as the implications this membership will have to NATO and our neighbors in the East.

We think that NATO should retain its nature as a defense system and should become the core of the security system in Europe. We want to become a full-fledged member of NATO with equal rights. We want to obtain security guarantees while contributing to the consolidation of the alliance. We want to provide a contribution to the defense force of the alliance. Among other things, the Sejm resolution on defense issues of 16 February this year signalled this position. The process of expansion will probably be gradual. However it should be based on clear and realistic criteria.

We think that cooperation as part of the Partnership for Peace should become increasingly more active during this process. This will allow the elimination of differences between countries that join and countries that are still aspiring for membership. We consider the formula for increased cooperation between NATO and Russia and Ukraine an important factor accompanying the process of expanding the alliance. However, this should not impose any restrictions on relations of other countries with NATO. Acceptance into the alliance is a sovereign decision of its members and the interested country. The process of expansion itself should be clear to everyone.

May it please the House: The North Atlantic Alliance also means political participation of the United States and Canada in shaping the new order in Europe. The United States has consistently supported democratic trends in Poland, as well as during the period preceding 1989. We appreciate the importance of support provided by the United States for reforms occurring in our country. We are maintaining continuous animated dialogue

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at the top level. My recent visit to Washington was a manifestation of this.

Political and military cooperation between our countries is increasingly being based on principles characteristic of a true alliance. This is particularly important to Poland and its safe development. Closer cooperation is an effective form of adjusting the Polish armed forces to NATO standards. It should cover more and more areas, including cooperation between arms industries. We think that economic cooperation with both the United States and with Canada still has a vast unutilized potential. We will continue to encourage direct capital investments from these countries in Poland.

We perceive the WEU as a European pillar of NATO and as a European defense segment. The fact that in May last year we were granted the status of an associated partner of this organization has strengthened our position. This is another step toward full membership of NATO and the European Union. It has increased the possibility for Poland joining the common foreign and security policy as outlined by the Maastricht Treaty. We intend to use fully the opportunities linked with this. Poland is closely following the construction of the foundations for military cooperation in the area of European security within the WEU.

The Eurocorps is becoming a new element in the European order. We think there is a need to establish specific forms of cooperation between the Polish Army and the Eurocorps. We would also welcome an opportunity to join the Western European armaments agency [not further identified]. We appreciate the importance of close cooperation between the member countries of the WEU. We would like to have our industry included in joint production projects. This will increase the export capabilities of this important branch of the economy.

May it please the House: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is currently an important factor actively directed against divisions in Europe. We will continue to support the OSCE in its preventive diplomatic efforts, in activities aimed at preventing conflicts. We are in favor of consolidating the human dimension in the OSCE's activities, including an increased role to be played by the Warsaw bureau for democratic institutions and human rights.

The Stability Pact signed in March this year should be noted as a positive initiative which has been undertaken recently on the general European arena. It has contributed to the intensification of bilateral relations in our region and a coming closer to the EU by the nine states that are associated with it now or are negotiating association treaties. Work on the pact has shown the practical usefulness of the regional perspective in the resolution of bilateral problems. The gathered statements ought to be exploited in the future undertaking of similar initiatives in the framework of the OSCE. Arms control and confidence building measures constitute a significant factor in security and stability on the continent. We will be continuing activities for the full implementation of the international treaties and accords that have been contracted in this sphere. Poland expresses itself unambiguously in favor of the full implementation process, in accordance with the adopted timetable, of the reduction of armaments envisaged in the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

We intend to undertake initiatives in bilaterlal relations on a regional and European-wide plane, making permanent the process of arms control and disarmament, of the increase of stability, openness, and predictability of the behavior of states in the military sphere. We intend to work on bilateral and regional means for the building of confidence and security, widening and supplementing the Europeam wide accords that are in force.

From the Western institutions, the Council of Europe has boldly and consistently proved its openness toward the new democracies on the continent. As an active and full member of this institution, we receive the process of widening of this organisation to the east with satisfaction. We acknowledge the particular role of the Council of Europe in the creation of a system of defense of human rights and of the rule of law on the entire continent, and also in the construction of a lasting democracy.

May it please the House: The road to prosperity and the presence in European civil society leads through full integration with the European Union. In signing the European Treaty in December 1991, and in presenting an application for membership in the European Union in April 1994, Poland specified unambiguously its aspiration toward participation in European integration. Membership in the EU will make permanent our new place in Europe and the world as a democratic and modern state.

It will become a mainspring for a dynamic economic, social, and civilizational development and a guarantee for national security. Our membership in the European Union, as well as other affiliated Central European states, is mutually advantageous. It therefore needs to be stressed that the stabilization of the process of transformations as well as the consolidation of democracy and market economy in Central Europe is not only in the interests of this part of the continent but also in the interests of the EU and all European countries.

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Jacques Santer, the new chairman of the European Commission, addressed this subject in the European Parliament. Regardless of any conclusions we may reach on the issue of the Union's enlargement, we must never forget the advantages that will be created for us by the development of those countries and their integration with the EU.

It is true that Poland's membership depends first and foremost on our meeting the political and economic conditions that have been set for us. However, it also depends on convincing our partners in the Union that it will be an advantageous investment. At the European Council meeting in December 1994 in Essen, the EU member states confirmed the will to incorporate the affiliated states into this organization. The declaration about the strategy of the incorporation of those states into the Union noted that they had achieved significant progress in political and economic reforms. At the same time it stressed that if reform tendencies are maintained in those countries, this will be their guarantee for their integration with the EU.

The onus, therefore, is on Poland and other affiliated states to make sure that the integration process becomes irreversible. We should try to work out a national strategy that will lead us to membership in the EU. Such a strategy should define tasks of different sectors of our state in the implementation of this objective. EU membership is not only a task for the Polish diplomacy; it is first and foremost a collective effort for the whole society. It will make basic national objectives, security, and civilizational development, real. It will also require many sacrifices and efforts. A wide-ranging study taken not just by state bodies but also by indepentent research centers on social consequences of our integration with the Union will be required. Results of this study will have to be presented to the public. An open debate should also be initiated. This is the way to realize a permanent political will linked with the awareness of costs and benefits connected with the integration.

We hope that Poland attains EU membership by the year 2000. We envision that after joining we will have guaranteed for us an adequately long transition period for full adaptation to its requirements. Poland has already attained the required level of stability in its political democratic institutions. The economic aims that are being realized by our country are coincident with EU aims. The adaptation of the Polish economy and Polish law to the conditions of association with the EU, and next of membership, still remains one of the most difficult undertakings which we must measure up to in the coming years. In our contacts with the EU so far, we have demonstrated that Poland is a responsible and credible partner. In this context, we greet the preparation by the EU of the so-called white book with satisfaction. It will facilitate our efforts directed toward the integration of Poland with the homogeneous market of the European Union.

In 1996 an intergovernmental conference of EU member states will commence, tackling issues relating to institutional reforms in the EU among other things. We expect to begin negotiations on the issue of our membership directly after its completion. Before this ensues, we would wish to join the discussions on the future shape of European integration being held before this conference. In this discussion we will be speaking out in favor of an EU that is strictly integrated, consolidated, and equipped with effective mechanisms for making decisions and efficient instruments of democratic control.

May it please the House: We are aware that our intentions toward integration are not possible without the regulation of, and with friendly, bilateral relations with all the states of the old continent. The partnership-based and friendly relations that link us to Germany are the crowning of the efforts devoted to reconciliation by people of good will on both sides. It is worthwhile to recall the farsightedness which the Polish bishops showed in their letter to the German bishops 30 years ago, the historical gestures of Chancellor Brandt or President Herzog, the many year long efforts of Catholic intellectual milieux or the exceptional engagement of the Marxist intellectual Mr. Rakowski in the improvement of Polish-German relations.

The constructive stance of Poland was important for the unification of Germany. I would also like to believe that the recent session of both chambers of the German parliament on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and also the speech there by the Polish minister of foreign affairs, were a continuation of the good tendencies in Polish-German relations. I am convinced that the upcoming visit to Poland by Chancellor Kohl will be a successive, important step in these relations. We have created the moral and legal bases for multidimensional cooperation between Poland and Germany—political, cultural, economic, as well as at the level of local communities and in contacts between people. We value highly the support of Germany for our integrationary aspirations. I would not hesitate to term the implemented change in Polish-German relations one of the most positive transformations in contemporary European history.

Our traditionally friendly and rich relations with France, which is such an important part of the EU, are a good basis for the construction of a feeling of coresponsibility for the shape of our continent and its identity. The potential contained in the many-centuries-long tradition

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of Polish-French relations, the unfailing attractiveness of French culture and French thought—all of these deserve wider exploitation. I wish to stress here the significance of cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland in the framework of the Weimar Triangle. It is in the interests of Poland to maintain and constantly enrich this form of cooperation, and to do so after we join the EU as well.

We value highly the initiatives of the United Kingdom that are favorable to Central Europe. I am thinking here of the British-Italian proposals for widened cooperation in the framework of the second and third pillars of the EU. We note with satisfaction the progress in the peaceful regulation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. We observe with sympathy the successes achieved in the EU by Ireland, a country toward which we traditionally harbor feelings of friendship. They are for us an important example of a successful integrationary policy. We are grateful to Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg for their favorable stance toward Poland. We still want to develop the very best relations with these countries. We also want to take advantage of the experience of efficient cooperation by the Benelux states. We note with attention the particular sensitivity of France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and of the entire EU, to the problems of the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. As a future member of Western integrationary structures, we treat these problems with entire seriousness. We also hope to participate in their resolution.

I would like sincerely to mention Austria, the country to which I had the honor of holding the post of ambassador of the Polish Republic. We want to take advantage of the experiences of several years of negotiations for membership in the European Union by this country friendly to us.

Our relations with the Holy See have a special character. Our concern for the just order of the world, for respect for values whose roots are in the Christian dimension of our culture, is mutual. We greeted Pope John Paul II on the occasion of his brief visit to the Polish land with joy.

May it please the House: Participation in subregional cooperation in Central Europe is an importanmt supplementation of integrationary processes on the European Continent. There are three reasons for which we highly value this type of cooperation. It is a form of preparation for and of bringing us closer to the EU, a favorable method of resolution of regional problems, and also a form of cooperation stepping beyond the EU framework of today. Poland is particularly actively engaged in three structures of subregional cooperation. These are the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, and the Council of Baltic Sea States. Despite our efforts, political cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Group has not attained the rate of movement and the level that we expected. Nevertheless, this group has had success in creating the Central European Free Trade Accord [CEFTA]. The four will shortly be joined by Slovenia, which will mean that CEFTA will become a free trade market across an area inhabited by 70 million people, reaching from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. Beginning in 1998, this organization will in practice be a form of economic integration. This undoubtedly strengthens the position of Poland in efforts to join the EU. The Central European Initiative, by virtue of the participation by Austria and Italy, is something we treat as a bridge between Central Europe and the EU and also as a practical instrument for overcoming the division of Europe. It contributes to the construction of a new European order, linking countries finding themselves once in opposed political-military blocs and today acknowledging the common values of parliamentary democracy, human values, and the market economy. We greet the company of the states of the Central European Initiative the countries today seeking membership of this organization: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.

We have a similar model of cooperation in the Council of Baltic Sea States. Cooperation within the Council is becoming more intensive, in spite of differences of development in participating states. Poland is an active member of this organization whose activity, besides military issues, encompasses practically all areas of relations between the states. The formula upon which the council acts also favors the deepening of cooperation with Nordic states, which are traditionally friendly to us, as well as the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. An especially wide range for cooperation exists in our relations with Lithuania. We are treating the transborder and interregional cooperation as an important instrument for the creation and development of Poland's new international relations. That cooperation serves the direct interhuman contacts, it serves to shape the economic relations, and supports local democracy in keeping with European conventions which were ratified by Poland and also in keeping with bilateral intergovernmental agreements.

May it please the House: Poland is not pursuing, and will not pursue, two separate Western and Eastern policies. Membership in Western structures and friendly relations with our Eastern neighbors are two mutually complementary and strengthening elements of just one strategy. These elements serve to guarantee security for Poland and ensure that conditions are met for successful

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transformation and development. We will have a patient and consistent foreign policy in relation to lands east of Poland, remembering that this area is famous for a considerable dynamism of changes and instability. Democratic and economically successful as well as sovereign development of states in East Europe, which would match aspirations of the nations in this area, is in Poland's interests. It favors regional and European stability. An effective transformation of the states in this area is a condition for durability of this geopolitical arrangement. We are striving to support these changes within our capabilities. We want peoples in this part of Europe to enjoy a better life. We want the principles of law and democracy to be established well. We want human rights to be observed as well as the development of the citizen society in those countries. We want a constructive cooperation with our eastern neighbors which would serve our mutual interests.

We are convinced that Poland's participation in the processes and structures of the Euro-Atlantic integration will also bring about benefits to our eastern neighbors because we do keep in mind the indivisibility of European security and a beneficial effect of the enlargement of the zone of stability. This enlargement is not meant to create new division lines in Europe but to overcome the old ones.

We want to share the feelings of togetherness and interdependence that are the basis of Poland's today's international policy with East European states. We are trying to enliven the political dialogue with the countries of the area, to increase the volume of trade, and to strengthen our economic presence. We are in favor of comprehensive and multilayered development of cooperation with Russia. Despite some difficulties, we must note with satisfaction the unquestionable achievements of this cooperation: the creation of a rich legal infrastructure, beginning with the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighborly Relations signed on 22 May 1992; and ending with the concluded and negotiated economic agreements. Their full implementation is our objective.

A clear increase in the trade exchange last year is a good omen for what can be achieved in the future. The gradually increasing passenger traffic came up to about 8 million visitors from the area of the former USSR, including about 2 million from the area of the Russian Federation. People who can cooperate with one another in trade and economy should also be able to communicate in other matters. We are making every effort to make our political relations, whose intensity has not reached the level of our economic cooperation and interpersonal contacts, even more dynamic. At the same time we stress that we would like to shape our relations with Russia in a partnerlike manner and in keeping with the recognized principles of democratic international relations.

We are trying to endow the Polish-Russian political dialogue with such partnerlike, open, matter-of-fact relations assuming there is good will, and without shying away from difficult problems. The recent talks between Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and mine with Minister Kozyrev were based on such principles. We intend to pursue this dialogue on many layers without narrowing it to the routine meetings of representatives of authorities and diplomatic consultations. Participating in this dialogue should be parliamentary and political communities, scientific and cultural elites, and representatives of different walks of life. Cooperation with Russia also considerably depends on whether we will be speaking in one voice on the basic issues of the Polish eastern policy.

We allocate an important place to relations with Ukraine. We are linked not only by historical ties, but also by a community of interests. We feel that the shaping of the principles of our strict partnership and cooperation, and in the sphere of security as well, ought to contribute to the strengthening of stability in Central and Eastern Europe. We will actively support the aspirations of Polish economic interests for the building of lasting trade, production, and investment ties with Ukraine. We attach particular weight to wide cross-border and interregional cooperation and also to cultural exchange between the societies of both countries.

In bilateral relations with our eastern neighbors, contacts with the sovereign republic of Belarus have significance. We have a lively interest in raising Poland-Belarusian economic cooperation in all spheres to a higher level, including the exploitation of the good geographic location of both states from the point of view of a European-wide system of communications and transport.

We intend to intensify bilateral relations in all areas with the states of Central Asia and the Transcaucausus. Our aim is the reconstruction where justified of broken or weakened economic ties, and also the creation of ties in new areas. With the aim of strengthening bilateral cooperation, we will be seeking the widening of the legal and treaty basis and also seeking to work on the development of the network of diplomatic and consular representative posts.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: Polish foreign policy concentrates on Europe, but it does not block the numerous and varied group of countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America from its field of vision. Our relations with this enormous and important area of extra-European cooperation have a mainly economic

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character. This does not, however, signify that the political problems of these countries are a matter of indifference to us. The object of our particular interest is the area of Asia and the Pacific, which has the greatest economic growth dynamic in the world. We seek the deepening of relations with the economically highly developed states, such as Japan or South Korea, or the intensively developing countries such as China or India. The Far Eastern journeys of the president, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the speaker of the Sejm have increased the possibilities for cooperation with this region. We expect that the development of our economy will encourage an exceptionally demanding partner in the shape of the Japanese corporations to invest directly in our country. China is a state with great economic possibilities. We will be aspiring to greater activity in this enormous market. We wish to participate in the great hydroconstruction projects of that state. We await the announced visit to Poland of Prime Minister Li Peng.

We hope that our relations with South Korea will develop on the basis of a strategic partnership of medium-sized countries. We have been developing links with the ASEAN nations. We appreciate the significance of supraregional organizations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC]. We want to join the dialogue between the European Union and ASEAN.

We undertake efforts to ensure Poland's participation in the meeting of the leaders of Europe and Asia which is scheduled for the beginning of 1996. We seek a comprehensive development of relations with Australia; we are convinced about wide-ranging possibilities for cooperation with this country. Polish diplomacy has consistently supported the peace process in the Middle East. Gradually, and not without difficulties, foundations for lasting cooperation are being built in this strategic region. Within our capabilities we would like to support this process; we are developing traditionally good relations with the Arab countries, and we hope for good relations with the state of Israel, which we have been rebuilding recently. This is proved both by the recent visit in this country of Jozef Oleksy when he was still Sejm speaker, and my visit there.

Our interest in the whole basin of the Mediterranean Sea finds its expression in our attempts to participate in multilateral institutions and meetings. Our effort to participate in the EU and the Mediterranean countries conference in Barcelona may serve as an example here. We will intensify contacts with South Africa. Following the political breakthrough, which we welcomed with satisfaction in Poland, wide-ranging possibilities for cooperation with this country have also opened in the field of construction.

We will develop economic cooperation with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The first visit in history of the president of the Polish Republic to five states in Latin America was an expression of the enlivening of our contacts with this area. Enlivening of the economic cooperation should be its outcome. Talks were also started on military cooperation. One of the important objectives is the regulation of legal and treaty issues as well as the protection of our economic interests in the integration processes which have been taking place there.

May it please the House: This year sees the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations. It creates an additional impulse for the discussion on the reform of this organization in which we have been actively taking part. We have made significant contributions in peace operations, and we are consistently involved in maintaining international peace and security. We are aiming to ensure that Poland has a place in the Security Council in 1996-97.

Poland greeted the unconditional and deadline-free extension of the application of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with satisfaction. It is an active participant in a series of important disarmament conferences and negotiations. In cooperation with the United Nations, an important place will continue to be taken by the promotion of economic development and also social issues and human rights. We will be exploiting the possibilities of the UN system, including the European Economic Commission, so as to support system transformations. Poland is consistently asking for social issues to be given a high rank in the activity of the United Nations. This is witnessed to by the participation of a Polish delegation, with the president of the Polish Republic, in the social summit in Copenhagen. This aim will also be served by our participation in the Fourth World Womens' Affairs Conference in September of this year in Beijing.

May it please the House: International cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection is of important significance to us, both within the framework of the UN system and also on a regional plane. For the ecogical security of the state, both the effective implementation of bilateral agreements with neighbors and the exploitation of the possibilities transpiring from multilateral conventions and support for activities intended to ratify successive international conventions will be important. We will continue to treat undertakings with the aim of increasing the safety of nuclear power stations with the greatest attention. We will undertake efforts intended to realize the concept of the ecoconversion of our foreign indebtedness.

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Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: We will attach particular weight to the creation of favorable conditions for the economic development of Poland. Poland will shortly become a member of the World Trade Organization. The exploitation of the possibilities transpiring from the ensuing liberalization of world trade will require from all Polish services abroad a significant organizational effort, better coordination, and an adept exploitation of the results of the GATT Uruguay round in the promotion of Polish economic and trade goals. We will draw particular attention to the improvement of our trade balance in goods turnover with abroad. It lies in our interest to exploit the transit possibilities of Poland, and to obtain resources serving the construction of an appropriate infrastructure and also the promotion of foreign investments in our country. This will require the maintenance of good cooperation with international financial institutions. Worth stressing is the fact that Poland has completely regulated financial relations with abroad. We are returning to the world capital market. We are gaining ever better evaluations from specialists.

We will assure indispensible diplomatic support for the negotiations being held on the issue of Poland joining the OECD. We hope that we will become a member of this organisation in the spring of 1996. This will bring us significantly closer to the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU.

May it please the House: System changes in Poland and other states, and the increase in the role of legal regulations in relations with abroad, and the appearance of many successor states, have caused the number of contracted agreements to increase radically, as well as the degree of their complication. This gives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs new obligations in the sphere of commenting upon draft agreements and also the fulfillment of the appropriate procedures associated with the contracting of new agreements and the cancellation of old ones which do not corrrespond to the present situation. For these reasons, an especially important significance for the coordinating role of the minister of foreign affairs in the treaty sphere would attach to the preparation by the government and the adoption by the Sejm of the law on the contracting and cancellation of international agreements. The regulations presently in force in this regard need to be updated and to have a change in rank to that of a law. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a draft of an appropriate law.

We received with attention the results of the work of the Sejm Extraordinary Commission considering the draft law on the ratification of the Concordat between the Holy See and the Polish Republic, and also the stance of the esteemed chamber on this matter. I am convinced that the permanent regulation of relations with the Holy See is in accordance with Polish intent. That too is why the government has undertaken and is continuing work in the joint commission on the preparation of an agreed declaration, which would be of assistance in further ratification work.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: In a democratic state, consular activity takes on particular significance. It is without a doubt wider and more effective than before 1989. It is sometimes the case that it has a spectacular character, as in the case of the evacuation of the nuns from Rwanda, or the negotiation of the freeing of the Polish hostages in Angola. Normally, however, this is responsible, day to day work, which also consists of bringing people under legal care and of assistance in cases of accident. The effectiveness of these types of activities requires the adaptation of the network of diplomatic and consular outposts to the new geopolitical situation. That too is why embassies have been created in all the states where there is a Polish minority and also additional consular offices, most recently in Grodno and Brest [in Belarus].

The past years were a real breakthrough as far as the freedom to travel by Polish citizens is concerned. This was connected to the abolishing of visas to almost all European countries and many other overseas countries. I should point out, however, that in March of this year a new situation was created by the effectiveness of decisions of the Schengen Treaty. The introduction of more severe checks on external borders of the states belonging to the Schengen zone should not, however, badly influence the intensity of contacts between nations. This concern will be shared by our Western partners. We believe that the integration of some of the countries should not take place at the cost of others.

The primary task of Polish policy in respect to Poles and persons of Polish origin residing abroad will be to strengthen their links with Poland and support their efforts in cultivating Polish language, tradition, and culture. We will continue activities aimed at the observance of European standards, guaranteed by treaties, for Polish minorities, first and foremost in postommunist states as well as the Polish ethnic group in Germany. We consider the development of multilateral cooperation with emigre communities in Western Europe, North and Latin America, and Australia as equally important.

From a five year perspective of a new look at issues of the Polish diaspora and Poles abroad, we notice a need for the critical reflection both on successes and failures of that period, taking into consideration the specific needs of a large Polish minority east of our borders. Without altering the aims of the Polish policy toward

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emigres we want to make it even better and much more effective.

Ladies and gentlemen: The promotional and information activities are one of the more important elements of Poland's external actions because they support the shaping of the image of Poland in the world and justify her political aspirations. This image depends on the economic and internal situation, political stability and clarity of the foreign policy, as well the level of civilization and culture.

It is worth remembering that promotional functions are also performed by Polish science and its major achievements. A large number of our university graduates often employed in the most prestigious research centers in the world forms a strong pro-Polish lobby.

Thirteen Polish institutes are now promoting Polish culture. Efforts of the ministry have recently been focused on the east. Soon the Polish Institute will be set up in Minsk and the Office of the Cultural Attache in Kiev. We consider the setting up of the Polish Institute in Tel Aviv as especially important. We attach great importance to the consolidation of our links with the Jewish diaspora whose many representatives are connected by various ties with our culture and country.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: I have presented the main elements of Polish foreign policy. I am convinced that this policy is compatible with our country's interests. Good will and support of deputies will be needed for our efforts.

Finally, I feel it is my duty to point out problems whose solutions remain within the remit of the esteemed Sejm.

First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always been extremely restrained in voicing its financial needs and has been very frugal in managing resources allocated to it. These resources are an indispensable condition for retaining and training highly qualified and professional foreign service staff, who should be able to stand up to the challenges of the current international situation. If you, ladies and gentlemen, agree that Poland has an indispensable need for an active foreign policy, you must to have the courage to solve the problem of ensuring appropriate material conditions, including the financial ones, for such a policy to be pursued.

Second, legal regulations concerning foreign policy should be put in order and extended. We need a law on signing foreign agreements, as well as a law on implementing decisions passed by the UN Security Council which should be in accordance with the legal order of the Polish Republic. Before the government submits a draft of the former, the new constitution should resolve the issue of the position of treaties in the legal order of our state. Such a solution should reiterate what has already been established with regard to this issue by the rulings of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal.

To end my address, I would like to emphasize strongly that the fulfillment of Poland's foreign policy requires guarantees for its effectiveness. I believe that the strengthening of the coordinating role of minister of foreign affairs is one of the most important conditions to ensure such effectiveness.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention.

Walesa Holds News Conference in Sejm

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[FBIS Editorial Report] Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish at 0900 GMT on 24 May carries a 25-minute live relay of a news conference by President Lech Walesa from the Sejm. The news conference is broadcast in progress.

It begins with Walesa saying, "...after familiarizing myself with the matter [proposed franchise for Radio Chechnya in Krakow], I learned that Polish law did not provide for the possibility that a franchise for this radio could be granted. At the same time, I repeat what I said thousand times. In my view, every man, every minority, every nation has the right to freedom, but this freedom cannot interfere with the freedom of others. Every state has the right to its territorial integrity, but it does not mean it has the right to use methods that are not recognized or have been condemned by the world. I have my reservations as far as the methods used there are concerned."

The next questions concern the presidential election and Walesa's possible decision to stand for reelection. He replies again that the time for such decision has not yet come, but he still favors good ideas. He has good ideas, and, if the nation wants him to stand, he will stand and he will win.

In reply to a question about relations with Prime Minister Oleksy after his visit to Moscow, Walesa says, "This is not an issue. On the ground of our conduct, I simply showed that it was a bad thing. I want this to be included in regulations and our conduct. This was the reason behind my statements, resolute statements, to regulate this issue. So, this is not a matter of my wanting to take revenge or to forgive. I am responsible for regulating matters in Poland, and I try to do this as well as I can."

More questions follow on the presidential election. Walesa repeats his view that the political scene should

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be better balanced and that he will only stand when there is a guarantee that he is able to act efficiently and is not isolated.

Next, correspondent Jerzy Kubrak, from the KURIER POLSKI daily, asks, "Mr. President, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy did not agree with the words by the pope that the believers in Poland had been pushed to the margins. How did you receive these words of the Holy Father?"

[Walesa] "It is a pity that our great countryman is misunderstood or that his words are picked and interpreted in various malicious ways. I think Prime Minister Oleksy and I were both baptized, so we share the same belief, and we should listen to our great countryman and not to see bad intentions in every word. For thousands of years the church proved that it helped our homeland to survive, and our shepherd given to us by Providence and history demands more understanding from all of us."

In reply to questions on NATO, Walesa briefly repeats his known views on NATO and Poland's membership as a gradual process.

Correspondent Robert Kowalski, from Television Panorama, asks, "Mr. President, in a recent interview for the Russian press, you compared yourself with President Yeltsin and said you are like him and that, if your actions were not hampered, all problems would be resolved. I have three brief questions. First, who hampers your efforts? Second, which problems? And third, what is your view on President Yeltsin's refusal to come to Katyn?"

[Walesa] "Let us start from the end. As far as the third question is concerned, we still do not know what has been decided. Talks and consultations are under way, and there has been no final decision yet. As regards the second question, who hampers, I think this is not a matter of hampering but a matter of questions. I was asked, in some context, how I see President Yeltsin, and I said that, when we had talks in Poland, our contacts were always fruitful and creative, so I was assessing our meetings. I do not recall the exact question. Now you ask me if I am like him. Of course, I do not walk on my head, and I am a president, too, so there are similarities. However, if the question is that later various situations changed, that we had some solutions accepted by the president in writing and [stated] publicly in Poland and later that they were changed, I think it was not decided by the president himself. So, I draw conclusions from certain situations."

Asked when the presidential election should be held, Walesa replies whenever the law permits. However, he tends to opt for a thorough discussion on personality and plans of a prospective president, which requires time.

In reply to a question referring to his statement in March giving Oleksy's government two months for concrete results before taking initiative himself, Walesa says he was misunderstood again and that he never intended to dismiss this government, nor has he immediate plans for the dissolution of parliament. However, he still thinks that a more balanced parliament, reflecting political attitudes of the public, would be desirable after the presidential election.

An unidentified correspondent then asks, "Mr. President, I would like to ask you your opinion of Foreign Minister Bartoszewski's speech and in particular of the question Mr. Bartoszewski asked—namely, that cooperation with Russia will depend on whether we speak with one voice on the basic issues of our eastern policy. Have things been going in this direction since your recent meetings with the prime minister and Minister Bartoszewski? Is Poland going to speak with one voice or not?"

[Walesa] "Ladies and gentlemen, if the conduct of Russia were to depend only on our one voice, we would sing really small and nicely. But Russia is guided by various solutions and does not look only at Poland. I return to what I already said. We have to do everything so there is one voice only regarding foreign affairs, and I am going in this direction so that what happened will never happen again."

Walesa talks again about the need for a balanced political scene. Next, he replies to the questions concerning his possible support for National Bank President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz as a presidential candidate and the possible support for him by the National Christian Union, ZChN. He says that Gronkiewicz-Waltz has not declared her intentions to stand, and that he can manage himself without ZChN's support; although, its political option is close to him.

An unidentified correspondent asks, "Mr. President, in Zakopane you announced the intention to set up a new political party. I would like to ask about preparations to this. Are there any structures already?"

[Walesa] "Again, it is not an accurate interpretation. I said that I had two options if I wanted to implement what should be implemented. First, to have support and second, one can have such support either by setting up a party or by getting involved or taking over another party. There is simply no other way. However, I have not chosen an option yet which would be efficient. So far, I am watching to see if what I say gives me a chance and whether the nation is ready to support me.

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If the answer is yes, then I am going to chose the way for the efficient implementation."

[Correspondent Joanna Ligocka] "PolSat Television. Zygmunt Wrzodak [head of Solidarity at Ursus tractor plant] said yesterday that in spite of your offer to help Ursus, you, as he put it, have made a fool of them. Could you comment on this."

[Walesa] "I do not know what he meant by that. There is no presidential system in Poland. So, in this particular matter I could not have done much more; although, I understand working people who fight for their rights. I said that my Chancellery, and I personally put myself at their disposal to resolve the matter. I show solidarity with working people as I know that they never get anything for free. At the same time, as far as methods are concerned, I want to prevent losses and not frighten others. I do not know what Mr. Wrzodak meant when he said that I wanted to use this strike for political ends."

Walesa then recalls his BBWR [Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms] initiative, but fails to confirm if he is going to set up a new party or just put forward a proposal and let others to do that.

An unidentified correspondent asks, "Mr. President, are you feeling isolated by the present parliamentary arrangement and does it hamper your decision on standing in the presidential elections."

[Walesa] "No, ladies and gentlemen, I do not feel isolated in a way you assume. I think that this demonstrates very well to the entire nation, most of whom are familiar with politics, how good ideas are being rejected. It all helps Poland and I only articulate this. Of course, this is not favorable directly to me, but this is good for Poland. I am satisfied that big mistakes, that all the rejections by the coalition, the isolation and fight with the president, is going to help us to choose solutions. Without these errors, without presumption, this coalition could rule safely for 100 years. However, it makes mistakes and this is going to lead it to a proper place."

[Correspondent] "Mr. President, you have said that this [parliamentary] arrangement is democratic and one cannot dissolve it. Does it mean that you have abandoned the idea of dissolving this parliament?"

[Walesa] "I say it for the 1000th time. As I am of the opinion that this arrangement is bad, I will strive to dissolve it at any opportune moment, but I cannot break the rules I was fighting for. In this connection this is my great difficulty."

[Correspondent] "What big mistakes by the coalition give you the satisfaction?"

[Walesa] "You demand too much of me, but even that there was no discussion when there was a dispute between the prime minister and the president. Even today, if we reviewed several proposals mentioned here, which were rejected because the majority said no, these are mistakes, sometimes overlooked. The nation is going to choose what it wants and it will notice that this arrangement is bad, as some things it supported were rejected. These are mistakes, but they are going to force good proposals in the future, including election proposals."

[Correspondent] "Mr. President, what is your opinion about a man from the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] becoming the next chairman of NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control], and what do you think about the view of a part of the coalition that you and your people control the State Protection Office?"

[Walesa] "We all see as we control, and we all see what the control in the state is. I want to say that today, and in future, I will make a note of all personnel changes. When we get it out of our system, everybody will be dropped even quicker than they enter their positions today. They, themselves, are setting an example and we will use this example, but note carefully all positions occupied by political appointments so as to be able to react later."

Spokesman Spalinski then announces the end of the news conference.

U.S. Ambassador Accused of Exceeding Powers

WS2505074595 Warsaw NIE in Polish 25 May 95 pp 1, 7

[Article by Henryk Schulz: "Is the U.S. Ambassador Representing His Government or Private Companies? Arrogant Pressure Exerted on Polish Authorities by Big Brother's Governor, Governor Rey"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An intimate letter from U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Rey, addressed to the most important politicians in Her Obscure Majesty, has fallen into our grubby little hands.

In his public statements, Jerzy Giedroyc expressed his concerns that Polish Republic No. 3 is excessively dependent on the Vatican and the United States. The old emigre politician is unaware of the monstrous dimensions Poland's vassalage has reached. Moreover, the majority of Poles have no idea how the governor of Big Brother is behaving in Warsaw.

Nicholas Rey feels authorized to interfere in the legislative process in Poland and does so without restraint, writing an official letter threatening Communications

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Minister Andrzej Zielinski and sending copies to the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and speakers of both houses of the Polish parliament.

The U.S. governor, using the title of ambassador as a disguise, wrote last April: "I am concerned about the potential effect an amendment to Article 14a of the draft telecommunications bill, passed by the Sejm on Friday, 21 April, may have on the U.S. company Ameritech. The amendment changes Article 14a regarding the role your ministry is to play in major tenders to read 'may' instead of 'must.'" According to His Excellency Rey, such arbitrariness on the part of the Sejm is unacceptable. The U.S. company Ameritech should get a concession without going through the bidding process, and that is final.

What does Nicholas Rey think would happen if those imbeciles in the Polish parliament passed a law disadvantageous for Ameritech? Well, Poland would no longer be considered a good business partner. The letter even hints that Poland might face difficulties in entering NATO, the EU, and the OECD. Therefore, it is not the obstinateness of Yeltsin or Grachev that can be an obstacle to our entering NATO but, rather, hurting the commercial interests of a U.S. corporation. Polish members of parliament and ministers should get this into their thick blockheads.

The intervention of the U.S. ambassador took place right in the middle of the legislative process, before the Senate's consideration of the bill and the Sejm's review of the Senate's position.

We asked a friendly Polish diplomat to assess the conduct of Ambassador Rey. He agreed, on the condition of anonymity, which he justified by his fear of being dismissed if Rey intervened with Bartoszewski. Our former ambassador referred to Rey's action as unheard of and unparalleled in diplomatic practice.

"I could imagine an attempt at diplomatic intervention in the legislative process of a sovereign state in an extreme case—for instance, if the parliament intended to an act on the nationalization of U.S. property without compensation or a law violating a major international convention," hypothesized our expert, "but intervention for the benefit of the commercial interests of a single company, which simply does not want to enter into a formal bidding process, is unheard of in diplomatic practice." "Even Soviet Ambassador Avyerkiy Aristov, known for his dictatorial behavior, would not have dared to do such a thing in the times of the People's Republic," said our interlocutor. Only the governor of a colony would be capable of such roguish and brutal intervention in the local legislative process. Never a foreign ambassador, accredited in a sovereign state.

The U.S. ambassador represents the President of the United States and the Department of State and does not use the authority of his state to protect the interests of individual companies. Besides, diplomatic custom provides that he officially apply to the government of the state to which he is accredited, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not customary to exert pressure on individual ministers. One may suspect that Ambassador Rey intervened on behalf of Ameritech on his own account, without authorization from the Department of State. It is difficult to imagine that Washington, despite its unceremonious treatment of Poland, would officially sanction any interference bearing the characteristics of blackmail into the Polish parliamentary legislative process only because some private company wants to beat out the competition and receive a telecommunications license without entering a tender.

Although we cannot prove it, we do know that Rey has already intervened with Polish state officials on behalf of a company applying for a license to publish telephone books. Nicholas Rey entered the diplomatic service immediately after having parted with that U.S. business. This gives ground for suspicion that he makes extra money on the side, representing the interests of U.S. companies and not only President Clinton and his policies. If, however, he decides to carry on in this way, it proves how good, almost governorlike, the U.S. ambassador feels in Warsaw.

Ambassador Rey's outrageous intervention is rooted in a decision issued four years ago by the then Minister of Communications Jerzy Wiktor Slezak. He issued a license to CenterTel (the same company that signed a contract with the police on wire-tapping—NIE No. 9/95), established by the state telephone company at the time and the concerns of Ameritech and France's Telecom. He also signed a "letter of intent" addressed to, among others, the U.S. company Ameritech, which promised CenterTel—i.e., Ameritech and its partners—that it would obtain a license for a more modern, future digital communications system without entering a bid.

Ambassador Rey points out the legal doubts related to Slezak's obligations.

CenterTel's license provided for the establishment and operation of a cellular phone network working as part of an analogous system, which had already begun going out of use, working on a frequency of 450 MHz, just when the world was changing to 900 MHz. The effects of the decision made by Slezak at the time are, to say the least, dubious.

CenterTel mercilessly drains its customers' wallets. The so-called activation—i.e., plugging a cellular phone into the network—costs $500 with the Polish CenterTel,

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while the average cost of this operation in West Europe is $48. One has to pay no less than $800 for a cellular phone in Poland, while such phones can be bought in Great Britain for approximately $75. Moreover, the company does not invest sufficiently in the technical infrastructure of the obsolete system, so the quality of connections leaves much to be desired. In exchange for exorbitant fees and poor quality of services, and in gratitude for an agreement infringing on customers' rights that the company signed with the police, CenterTel shareholders were to receive—in line with the obligation Wiktor Slezak entered in the so-called letter of intent dated October 1991—a license for launching and operating another modern, digital cellular phone network.

It seems Slezak exceeded his powers by signing the "letter of intent," or, in any case, entered a very unfortunate obligation giving the ambassador a reason to demand that CenterTel, partially owned by Ameritech, seize a license for a new network—digital this time—with special treatment and without entering the formal bidding process.

Slezak's conduct seems all the more suspicious because, after having resigned from the post of communications minister, he became president of the Board of Directors of Polish Telecommunications SA [TP SA] (a legal successor to Polish Post, Telegraph, and Telephone), CenterTel's major shareholder and Ameritech's partner. This means that as a minister he entered into an obligation on behalf of state authorities to issue a license without a bid to the company of which he became head. One may thus suspect that he acted having already received an offer to take the new post and used his ministerial authority in a way that was to benefit him in the future.

A digital cellular phone network in Poland will bring its owners an income in the hundreds of millions of dollars. To realize how big the sums involved are, it is enough to say that the licensing fee itself will probably amount to about $200 million, whereas initial investments will consume between several hundred million dollars and $1 billion. At the NIE editorial office, we are strangely confident that the U.S. company and its partners will get what they are after, even without the U.S. ambassador's intervention. Regardless of what the deputies decide. Former Minister Slezak, currently head of the Board of Directors of TP SA, a partner of Ameritech in CenterTel, has close ties to current Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski. We wrote about a network of strange connections in the Ministry of Communications and the joint ventures it runs in the article "Ministers Are Doing It for Themselves" (NIE, No. 7/95).

We believe that the uncovered scandal should lead to the banishing of Slezak from the telecommunications business. Moreover, we think that Polish authorities, for the sake of bilateral relations, should demand that the United States recall its ambassador, who has humiliated himself so much.

We are enclosing Polish-language versions of documents [from Slezak and Ambassador Rey], as well as the header and signature line from the original English text of Rey's letter.

Reportage on Kuklinski Appeal Trial

Possible Judges Profiled

WS2405131595 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 18 May 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Piotr Jakucki: "They Sentenced Solidarity, and They Will Revise Kuklinski's Sentence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only one of the judges who are currently members of the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court [IWSN] did not pass sentences during the Martial Law. On 25 May, a revision trial will commence in IWSN concerning the case of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. It will probably be held in the same room in which General Emil Fieldorf, pseudonym "Nil," was posthumously rehabilitated.

The extraordinary appeal from the death sentence passed in May 1984 by the court of the Warsaw Military District [WOW] (in 1990 the sentence was changed to 25 years in prison) will be examined by five judges. This is envisioned in the regulations because it will be an appeal from capital punishment.

Kuklinski will be defended by Piotr Dewinski, Krzysztof Piesiewicz, and Jacek Taylor. In defending the colonel, they will demand his complete rehabilitation.

Participating in the trial will also be a representative of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office; according to unofficial information, it will be Major Jaroslaw Cieplowski.

After 13 December 1981 only one judge of the Military Chamber did not pass sentences against activists and supporters of the underground "Solidarity" ["S"] and opposition. The others were conscientiously carrying out the recommendations of the Military Council for National Salvation [WRON].

Since June 1990 IWSN has been headed by General Janusz Godyn, who in the early 1980's passed sentences in Katowice. However, according to our sources, the punishments that he administered were relatively mild.

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In trials that were conducted summarily he pronounced the lowest sentences, that is, three years in prison. Before assuming the office of chairman of IWSN, he was, among others, the chief justice of the WOW court. It is highly probable that he will be the chairman on the judges' panel at the trial, due to the precedential nature of the case.

Stanislaw Kosmal us the chairman of the department.

In IWSN sentences are also passed by the following judges:

Jozef Medyk—also worked in Katowice during the Martial Law. He also tried, among others, participants of the strike in the "Piast" mine in December 1981.

Edward Matwijow came to the Military Chamber from the court of the Pomeranian Military District [POW] in Bydgoszcz.

Jerzy Steckiewicz—the chairman of the department [as published]; during the Martial Law and in the 1980's he passed sentences in the WOW Military Court and in the Supreme Court. He was the chairman of the judges' panel of the WOW Military Court, which in January 1986 sentenced Jozef Szaniawski to 10 years in prison in the so-called case of Radio Free Europe.

Wieslaw Maciak—former chief justice in the Court of Air Troops in Poznan.

Stanislaw Przyjemski—according to GAZETA POLSKA's sources, he had the greatest achievements among the judges that pronounced sentences in the Military Chamber. He was a prosecutor in the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, then he was promoted to a post in the Supreme Court. He became famous for demanding draconian punishments for activists of underground organizations and "S." In the 1980's he published articles in WOJSKOWY PRZEGLAD PRAWNICZY on the punishments that soldiers could receive for violating the principles of "people's justice." In 1993 he was responsible for the failure of the extraordinary appeal from a sentence passed during the Martial Law on Father Sylwester Zych and a conspiratorial group of young people from Grodzisk.

Andrzej Kamienski—former lecturer at the Feliks Dzierzynski Military Political Academy in Warsaw. During the Martial Law he was a prosecutor in POW. He was famous for passing severe sentences. Even after 1989 he dealt with the dismissal of officers with rightist views from the Armed Forces.

Marian Bulinski—before joining IWSN he worked in the Military Garrison Court in Olsztyn.

Bogdan Rychlicki—a judge from the military court in Koszalin.

Jozef Dolhy—the only judge who did not pass sentences in the 1980's. During the trial in May he will be the judge rapporteur.

Loyal Brothers of WRON

During the Martial Law military courts passed harsher sentences against the opposition than civilian organs of justice. The courts which were considered particularly repressive are: the WOW court (sentences were passed there by such military judges as Colonel Dudzik or Major Przykucki, and the Navy Court in Gdynia. Ewa Kubasiewicz, an activist of the underground "S," was in 1982 sentenced there for a long term in prison by Judge Grzybowski.

According to our information, there are three judges who were part of the judges' panel of IWSN before 1989 and who are still working there; they are: Kosmal, Medyk, and Steckiewicz. Others have come to IWSN from regional courts or have been appointed to those posts from the reserve. According to GAZETA POLSKA's sources, the files of the "regional judges," concerning the 1980's, have been "cleaned."

Presidential candidate Adam Strzembosz, who has been the first president of the Supreme Court for the last five years, could have dismissed the discredited judges. However, he did not do that.

Jaskiernia Wants To Overrule

It is not certain whether the appeal trial will be held at all. Jerzy Jaskiernia, minister of justice and prosecutor general, wants to overrule the decision "for legal reasons." According to his interpretation, the first president of the Supreme Court is a one-person establishment that is appointed and recalled by the Sejm. Thus, only Professor Strzembosz is authorized to sign motions requesting appeal trials; also, the first president cannot give himself leave or appoint an acting president. However, according to one of Kuklinski's plenipotentiaries, the procedure for submitting the appeal motion was correct.

In the appeal trial an important factor will be the role of the representative of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office. This office is currently headed by General Ryszard Michalowski. His predecessors in the 1980's were party officers: Jozef Szewczyk (from April 1975 to April 1984) and Henryk Kostrzewa (from 1984 to 1990).

According to the regulations, the chief military prosecutor is, by virtue of his office, the deputy of the prosecutor general. Therefore, Jerzy Jaskiernia—as an official supervisor—can order the representative of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office to take a strictly specified

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stand; for example, he may tell him to announce that the motion requesting an appeal trial in the case of Col. Kuklinski, submitted by Stanislaw Rudnicki, is illegal.

Judges Chosen; Names Kept Secret

WS2405120395 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 24 May 95 p 3

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "The Law. In 1985 a Communist Court Sentenced Him to Death; Kuklinski Once Again"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Judges of the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court drew slips from a hat to justly select those who will preside over the extraordinary appeal to Colonel Kuklinski's case tomorrow.

The names of the five "lucky winners" are to remain secret until the trial. "We do not want unnecessary discussions on the particular judges. They should not be subject to any additional stress before the trial," says Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Chwiloc, spokesman of the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court.

To avoid charges that the judges are not impartial, General Janusz Godyn, president of the Military Chamber, ordered that a drawing be held. He personally took part in it. The judges drew the names not from a hat but from the beret of one of their colleagues. "This is unprecedented," admits Lt. Col. Chwiloc.

It is now known that no one "from the street" will be present in the courtroom—only 45 seats available, all long reserved by journalists. The judges could not rent a larger room because they have to conduct trials at their headquarters.

The Polish Film Chronicle will register the trial for future generations, and a representative of the U.S. Embassy—perhaps the consul himself—will file a report to the U.S. authorities.

Only the colonel's defendants and the prosecutor will speak at the trial. Unless something unexpected occurs, a verdict will be passed the very same day. [passage omitted]

Jaruzelski Writes to Sejm

WS2405133095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 May 95 p 14

["Text" of letter sent to the Sejm Commission of Constitutional Responsibility by Wojciech Jaruzelski, former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party: "The Extraordinary Appeal to Kuklinski's Case; Jaruzelski Asks: Can You Be Accused of Betraying the State and Defending It Simultaneously?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *In the 7 April issue of RZECZPOSPOLIT, we published the full text of the extraordinary appeal in favor of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, submitted by the first president of the Supreme Court. Following publication of the appeal, Wojciech Jaruzelski [former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party] asked us to publish the text of a letter-cum-statement he sent to the Sejm Commission of Constitutional Responsibility. Below is the text of that letter.*

"In light of the proceedings currently under way on the issue of the accountability of the so-called authors of Martial Law, I wish to appeal to the commission to reflect on the opinions the first president of the Supreme Court included in his explication to the extraordinary appeal to Ryszard Kuklinski's case (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 7 April 1995).

"The first president of the Supreme Court states: '(...) it should be considered whether under the circumstances R. Kuklinski operated in, having access to the deepest secrets of the Warsaw Pact states (...), his activities should be interpreted in the context of the countertype specified in Article 23 of the Penal Code on higher necessity.'

"It is not worth debating 'who had more access to the deepest secrets (...).' The knowledgeability of former top state and Armed Forces authorities that are now being charged was far greater than that of R. Kuklinski.

"The first president of the Supreme Court calls for accounting for '(...) the acknowledged fact that Poland's sovereignty was strongly infringed upon at the time and that there existed a direct threat of intervention by the Soviet Union and neighboring states of the former Warsaw Pact, considering that R. Kuklinski was well aware of the true state of affairs and took desperate action to prevent the direct threat of invasion by informing heads of state who had an influence on the fate of the world.' He goes on to say that 'the law does not specify which values can be protected by sacrificing others, albeit state security is undoubtedly a far more superior value than treason of state, particularly when it is committed for the sake of higher need. It was impossible to disclose the secrets and inform the world of the threat of invasion and the pending imposition of Martial Law without leaving the country. The sovereignty and independence of the state, protecting it against an invasion, is a legally protected value.'

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"In light of the aforementic..ed opinions of the first president of the Supreme Court, the following questions arise:

"1) How should the above passage from the text of the extraordinary appeal be interpreted, considering that representatives of various political circles, the Sejm included, stated that the Polish Peoples' Republic was an 'enslaved, vassal, occupied' state? May one say that the first president of the Supreme Court has thus expressed his view that, at the time, state security was threatened by invasion and the sovereignty of Poland was legally protected? Does this not apply to the intentions of the so-called authors of Martial Law?

"2) Is it true that, as the extraordinary appeal claims, the intention to '(...) inform the world of the threat of invasion and the pending imposition of Martial Law' proves that R. Kuklinski, 'being fully aware of the facts,' was certain of the threat that existed in 1981? Does this not mean that the so-called authors of the Martial Law shared the same fears?

"The crux of the matter, however, is that the imposition of Martial Law actually prevented that threat. What, thus, could R. Kuklinski's role have been? The extraordinary appeal claims he 'made an attempt to counteract the direct threat by informing the states that had an influence on the fate of the world.' The text goes on to speak of 'informing the world of the pending invasion (...).' R. Kuklinski, however, obviously chose the wrong addressees. This was neither 'the world,' nor 'world leaders,' 'Solidarity,' the church, the pope, the London government [in exile], Western mass media, etc., but simply the CIA. Such was the culmination of long years of espionage, a voluntary violation of the military oath, treason, and desertion. This cannot be 'covered up for' by force with noble intentions. We know the effects. Kuklinski's escape did not lead to any preventive measures from the West at the time.

"The first president of the Supreme Court forcefully points out that R. Kuklinski, 'being fully aware of the facts,' wished to 'prevent the direct threat of invasion.' That threat was real. The appeal justly states that this '(...) well-known fact should be taken into consideration.' I do share the view that the issue should be explained. Yet explanations, differences of opinions, and debates will continue for decades to come, perhaps even longer. We now know the stance of the first president of the Supreme Court, his opinion on R. Kuklinski's knowledge of facts and intentions. The question thus arises of whether the assessments and intentions of the so-called authors of Martial Law, their sense of responsibility for the pending threat, continue to be questioned. Especially as they also had to deal with an increasingly critical internal situation." [passage omitted]

Journalists Meet With Russian Colleagues

WS2405150395 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 May 95 p 29

[Article by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk: "Meeting With Russian Journalists in Warsaw; There Are Many Confirmed Democrats in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "Forget about Russia; do not be afraid of it, and live as you like. Join NATO as quickly as you can. What kind of veto right can Russia have in the case of a free and sovereign country, such as Poland? As a matter of fact, such things as a conception of a foreign policy toward Poland do not exist." These are the opinions Russian journalists expressed at a meeting with their Polish colleagues on 18 May. [passage omitted]

The issues that are important to Nikitinsky, Yoffa, and their colleagues are human rights, which were brutally violated in Chechnya. They are not certain, they said, that these rights will not be violated in other places as well. This is why Cherkizov believes that the "Free Caucasus" radio should be established right here in Poland, in a country that for many years has been a symbol of the fight for human rights. They also discussed the issue of the "Free Caucasus" radio with the Polish prime minister and the president. At the meeting with Polish journalists, they cautioned Poles not to swerve from the road that has been chosen, not to succumb to the temptation of double bookkeeping, and not to give up the idea of helping those who have the courage to spread the truth about the enormities of the war that is being waged in Chechnya.

Opinion Poll on Prime Minister Oleksy, Government

WS2505114895 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 May 95 p 3

[Article by "(ER)": "Well About the Government, Better About the Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Prime Minister Oleksy is performing very well in office," claim 55 percent of Poles. A further 20 percent state the opposite, and 25 percent do not have an opinion.*

Those who praise the prime minister most often tend to be leftists and center-leftists, while his critics are mainly supporters of the right and center-right.

Nearly one-half of Poles (46 percent) consider the economic program of Prime Minister Oleksy's government

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good, as compared with 19 percent who claim it is "not good." As many as 35 percent of those polled claim it is "difficult to say."

Of those polled, 31 percent (a growth of 4 percent as compared with last February) say "things in Poland have changed for the better since the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party have begun to govern. Yet critical opinions dominate. A large group of 47 percent of those polled claim that things have turned for the worse, and 22 percent do not have an opinion.

The poll was carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion on 13-16 May, on a sampling group of 1,081 people.

Poll: Opposition Unity Against Coalition Wanted

WS2505114395 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 May 95 p 2

[Report by "KNYSZ": "Public Opinion Research Center: Opposition, Close Your Ranks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As many as 40 percent of Poles want the old Solidarity camp to unite and conquer the postcommunists in the presidential elections.

Every second person who was a member of Solidarity before December 1981 wants the old opposition to join forces against the currently governing coalition. Advocates of this idea are primarily representatives of the intelligentsia, businessmen, unskilled blue-collar workers, inhabitants of large cities, and supporters of the right. As many as 36 percent of Poles agree that the current government is resorting to methods typical of the People's Republic. This view is particularly popular among those who would like to see the postcommunists defeated in the presidential election. A larger group—50 percent—does not identify this phenomenon. It is composed mainly of management cadres supporting the left.

The opinion poll was carried out between 5 and 10 May on a random representative group of 1,203 adult Poles.

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Daily Exposes Smuggling, High-Level Corruption
AU2405192395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 18 and 22 May carries on page 3 a two-part report by Dan Andronic and Mirel Ciurea entitled: "Operation 'Money for the Party,'" purporting to disclose the "dirty affairs" of unnamed high officials "done in the name of the party." The only official named in these disclosures is Mihai Panzariu, general director of the General Customs Directorate. The 1,500-word Part I appears in EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 18 May under the subheadline "The Violation of the Embargo Against Yugoslavia—A Billion Dollar Affair," and deals with alleged violations of the UN embargo against Yugoslavia. After mentioning that the embargo is systematically broken by local people in the border area who are "engaged in smuggling small amounts of gasoline across the border," the authors proceed to enumerate other violations carried out by high officials "in the name of the party, without mentioning what party they are talking about." Thus, "a firm in the northeastern part of the country with serious connections in the Ministry of Interior" is allegedly involved in illicit oil transactions with firms in Yugoslavia—the authors write, quoting confidential sources. Aside from that, "in the past year or so, the press has reported in detail on the interception by the Financial Oversight Body of many truck convoys transporting fuel to Yugoslavia." However, "what the press did not say was that high-ranking police officers were accompanying these convoys." Sometimes, the Financial Oversight Body "pretended not to hear the code word 'Money for the Party'" and stopped the convoys. But on other occasions, the convoys were allowed to cross the border into Yugoslavia with the "tacit consent" of the Financial Oversight Body. "Of course," the article adds, "everybody knows that the embargo is being broken, but not everybody knows that Defense Ministry Colonel Mihai Panzariu, general director of the General Customs Directorate, has closed the Jimbolia customs office for five months, from 1800 until the next morning, for a single reason: to permit the passage of whole train cargoes with products that fall under the UN embargo stipulations." The article proceeds to name several companies specialized in transporting diesel oil to Yugoslavia, thus breaking the UN-imposed embargo, "with the consent of the authorities": SC Lux Impex SRL from Caras Severing, SC Lux Impex SRL from Drobeta Turnu-Severin, and SC Lux Impex SRL from Timisoara. According to the authors, the money resulting from the operation "Money for the Party" is split as follows: "22 percent goes to the party; 5 percent goes to the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI); 5 percent goes to the Ministry of Interior (Military Unit 0215); and 68 percent goes to personal bank accounts."

EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 22 May carries the 1,300-word Part II of the report under the subheadline: "Mihai Panzariu Authorizes the Restitution of Billions of Lei to the Networks of Arab Traffickers." The authors describe a swindle involving Arab importers of Ness coffee into Romania, who ask the authorities to recalculate the customs fees paid on the arrival of the products from abroad. "Mihai Panzariu, very concerned with the fate of the Romanian citizen who has to pay 4,000-5,000 lei for a Ness coffee box but also concerned with the fate of the poor Iraqi merchant who allegedly paid too high customs fees, approves the recalculation of the fees." Consequently, the merchants are being given back most of the money, their actual customs fees thus becoming "extremely low." The authors wind up their article wondering "why Mihai Panzariu can approve of such a practice that is to the detriment of the state budget."

PD President Advocates Association With NATO
AU2405122995 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 19 May 95 p 3

[Article by Radu Calomfirescu: "Democratic Party Petre Roman: The Scale Should Be Tilted Toward NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The accord of all parties in Romania regarding the country's integration into NATO structures is simply a formality," said Democratic Party [PD] President Petre Roman. The parties included in the government coalition do not miss a single opportunity to reiterate their wish to see our country join the Euro-Atlantic structures. However, the policy of isolation and departure from the Council of Europe makes the association to the Western system of alliances very difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Petre Roman, in his capacity as special rapporteur, will present the report "To Understand the NATO Expansion and To Really Work For It—A Study That Comes From the Intermediate Space" at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, which will be held at the end of this month in Budapest.

This report tackles the problem of those states which, for the time being, are located, from a geopolitical viewpoint, between the spheres of influence of the West and of Russia, in a space for whose "conquest" the "battle" between the big powers has already started. The theses in Mr. Roman's document place Romania in the NATO system of alliances. The alternative offered by the representatives of the "great neighbor and friend in the East" is to look "beyond NATO" for our security.

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This is the central idea included in the report that will be presented on the same occasion by Russia's rapporteur.

"Well, democratic tradition is not sufficient to make transition easy. Our current delicate geopolitical situation is also important," says Mr. Roman.

As far as the direct relations with Hungary are concerned, Mr. Roman says that since we are aware of the fact that these are influenced by the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, we should forward concrete data that confirm how many posts of mayors and councillors, and how many schools, high schools, universities, and others have been assigned to Hungarian ethnics after the December 1989 revolution. These figures are very suggestive for the international public and can assist the clarification of those aspects that are connected to the alleged nonobservance of the rights of this minority.

Tinca Discusses Visit to Russian Federation

95BA0239A Bucharest OBSERVATORUL MILITAR in Romanian 12 Apr 95 pp 1, 12

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Tinca by Colonel Vasile Stan; place and date not given: "The Visit of the Romanian Minister of Defense to the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Between 5 and 8 April, the Romanian Minister of Defense, Gheorghe Tinca, paid a visit to the Russian Federation at the invitation of the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev. Other members of the Romanian delegation included Lieutenant General Nicolae Schiopu, deputy chief of the General Staff; Rear Admiral Eng Sorin Raducanu, deputy chief of the Department of Army Equipment and Logistics; and Major General Gheorghe Rotaru, chief of the Directorate for Political and Military Analysis and International Relations. During the visit, the delegation held meetings at the Ministry of Defense with the minister of defense, Army General Pavel Grachev, and they were received by V. M. Shumeyko, president of the Russian Federation Council. The delegation visited the 27th Mechanized Brigade, "Sevastopol," an airborne troops element; the airbase at Kubinka; the General Staff Academy; the Cosmodrome at Plesetk; the aircraft factory in Moscow, and cultural and artistic sites.*

[Stan] Mr. Minister, for the readers of our newspaper, could you give us the context in which the visit to Russia took place?

[Tinca] It was in response to the visit last year to Romania by the Russian defense minister, Army Gen. Pavel Grachev. Since then, with the well-known pace of change that has taken place in Europe—and particularly in our area of concern—a number of issues have arisen on which it is important for us to understand each other's position, and for us to inform each another. Also, in the agreement that we signed then, we agreed to have annual visits. And finally, these visits are normal among neighbors. We have these types of visits with other neighbors of ours.

[Stan] We would appreciate it if you could outline what you discussed and what conclusions were drawn.

[Tinca] There was a heavy emphasis on understanding, an atmosphere characterized by respect and sincerity. Take for example the invitation by Mr. Grachev to visit the Cosmodrome at Plesetsk. This is a site that until recently was a deep secret. The invitation attests to the fact there is nothing hidden between two neighbors when there is the sincere desire for mutual understanding. In fact, this is the way we should handle military relations with all our neighbors. In the case of Russia, there is an added dimension—the fact that Russia is a great power and we are interested in developing ties to it—especially economic ties.

[Stan] What can you tell us about results of the visit?

[Tinca] We gave a detailed briefing on the status of the reform of our army, of the first phase of restructuring and of the objectives that we are pursuing—namely, the reform of the army and, at the same time, its modernization. In this context, I would make the following point: Bilateral relations do not mean reducing military contacts to merely cooperating in the technical arena; rather, in the spirit of the agreement that I referred to above, they mean development of contacts among different echelons—and taking over, practically speaking, the training of officers in our system of military training. We will participate in military exercises, either national exercises or in the context of the "Partnership for Peace." Nonetheless, cooperation in the technical domain remains important. I was interested in doing something for our Air Force, and, in keeping with the rebuilding program we have, we discussed certain options to obtain spare parts, a dual-control MiG-29, and technical discussions in certain areas. The Russian side was receptive to all of these matters, so experts will meet to discuss the specifics. Actually, this work has already begun, with meetings between the experts who accompanied us and experts from the Russian side.

Concerning the review of security in Central Europe and Europe in general, we presented our option for integration into the European and Atlantic structures, but we stressed that although engaged in the evolutionary process of integrating into NATO, Romania does not want to do anything that would damage relations with Russia. We said we do not wish to take part in any

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policy that is hostile to Russia, but that NATO should not be viewed as being hostile to Russia. Russia is a great military and nuclear power. Thus we must participate in an architecture of security, in a system of collective European security from which Russia must not be isolated and which must permanently develop a dialog with her. This reality makes imperative special ties between Russia and the United States and NATO, respectively. This special relationship must reflect the responsibility that Russia and the other nuclear powers have for the security—and above all the nuclear security—of the entire world. The Russian side presented to us their arguments concerning NATO. They pointed out that the majority of public opinion and certain political circles in Russia have their doubts about the wisdom of maintaining this bloc after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; and that expanding it to integrate other countries, particularly in the Baltics, is inexplicable. This could require Russia to, in turn, take certain countermeasures, among which would be the distribution of its conventional forces in a manner other than that called for in the Vienna Convention. The discussion of these issues only underscored the usefulness of a dialog, of the exchange of views, so that the positions and perceptions of the parties can be more correct and better understood. Together we agreed to hold a meeting this summer, in Romania, of experts in the political-military arena from the two ministries, to analyze further the matter of European security.

[Stan] Did you also discuss these matters with Mr. Shumeyko? And did you arrive at the same conclusions?

[Tinca] We also held discussions with Mr. Shumeyko on security and stability in the region. The Russian side appreciated the open and sincere manner in which we presented our views. We agreed that the dialog should continue during the visit he will be making to Romania. Additionally, Mr. Shumeyko has just returned from Moldovia, where he had talks with all the political forces there, both in Kishinev and in the Transdniester. He told me that there is a unity of views, and that Russia is committed to assisting Moldavia in obtaining its sovereignty. It is committed to withdrawing the 14th Army—or, more accurately, what remains of it, since from the point of view of personnel, it has very few troops at its disposal—but there is a major problem with the large quantity of arms and munitions that are still there. He also told me that he said to the Russian minority there that they are not Russian citizens but citizens of Moldavia, and that they must benefit from the rights that are recognized in international treaties and in the understanding with the government regarding the treatment of minorities.

[Stan] In what other activities did you participate?

[Tinca] We visited two military units (a mechanized brigade and the airbase at Kubinka). We witnessed an aviation demonstration with the MiG-29 and the Suhoi-25 and Suhoi-27 that the Russian aviators were preparing as part of the 8 May celebrations. We visited the memorial complex, "The Central Museum of the Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland 1941-1945," the General Staff Academy, and an aircraft assembly plant in Moscow. On the second-to-last day of the visit, the Russian minister suggested that the delegation visit the Cosmodrome at Plesetsk, where the delegation had the opportunity to view the system of intercontinental missiles and the launch pad for orbiting spacecraft to study the cosmos.

[Stan] How would you characterize the visit overall?

[Tinca] The discussions and the entire visit were carried out in an open and sincere atmosphere. There was mutual respect for our positions. There was the clear mutual desire for cooperation and the building of our relationship on the basis of trust. You will soon see concrete results, as members of our delegation in different areas have already identified, with their Russian counterparts, a number of opportunities to bring to fruition matters agreed upon.

[Stan] Thank you!

[Tinca] And thank you, as well.

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Federal

Sanctions Cause Large Loss in Machine-Building

LD2405092795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0906 GMT 24 May 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, Yugoslavia, May 24 (TANJUG)—Director general of the machine-building industry in Nis, Milovan Krivokapic, told TANJUG on Tuesday that in the three years of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, the company had lost a 250-million-plus dollar income on foreign markets.

Speaking within TANJUG's survey of adverse effects of the three years of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia, Krivokapic said the loss of markets that were important for the country was an even more disastrous effect.

In this context, he said it would take considerable effort and capital to regain positions lost on foreign markets.

Before the imposition of unjust sanctions on Yugoslavia under U.N. Security Council Resolution 747 on May 31, 1992, the company's annual import amounted to as much as 120 million dollars, he said.

Krivokapic said because of the sanctions, the average use of capacities had dropped by 60 percent, while about 2,000 employees had been laid off with token pay.

'Despite extraordinary difficulties, the machine-building industry has managed to maintain vital programmes and master production of one hundred spare parts, which is of vital importance to the substitution of import and reappearance on world markets after the lifting of the blockade,' he said.

Analysis of FRY Army's Reorganization

95BA0247B Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 May 95 p 17

[Article by Mario Galic: "Back Across the Drina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The war intentions of the "peace-loving" Milosevic; three new Serbian armies are being created, in Belgrade, Podgorica, and Nis, with separate corps commands.*

After the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] attacked Slovenia in June 1991, the Slovene officers and some of the Croatian ones left it. When the war in Croatia also began shortly afterward, the rest of the Croats left, but also some of the Muslim officers. With the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rest of the Muslims also left the JNA. Not long afterward, when the JNA left Macedonia, the Macedonians left, too. Thus, in less than two years, the JNA became what it had always sought to be: the national army of the Serbs and Montenegrins. The abandonment of military installations in Slovenia and Croatia, and partly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the departure of officers of Slovene, Croatian, and Muslim nationalities, most affected the Air Force and Navy, branches in which Croats and Slovenes were the basis of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps, and at the same time the best experts. The Navy was especially hurt by the abandonment of the shipyards and repair facilities in Croatia, and since then the Serbian Navy has not acquired even one new warship. At the same time, the Air Force was left without the large repair institute in Velika Gorica near Zagreb and the aircraft factory near Mostar, and without several large air bases. The largest force of the now completely Serbianized Army remains in the ground forces, which are waging war with all their might on the battlefields of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the creation of the so-called Yugoslavia, the time has also come to create a new army. An integral part of the big reorganization is also the change in its name to the "Army of Yugoslavia," which still consists of ground, air, and naval forces.

Creation of New Armies

The changes in the attitudes of world policies toward Serbia have also influenced the Army's internal organization. That army allegedly withdrew a long time ago from the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Three armies are being created, the first with its headquarters in Belgrade and its corps commands in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Valjevo, and Uzice. The second has its headquarters in Podgorica and its corps commands in Podgorica and Pristina. The third has its headquarters in Nis and its corps commands in Nis, Kragujevac, and Leskovac. Of these three armies, the strongest is the first, in Belgrade, and the weakest is the second, in Podgorica. The most obvious shortcoming of this kind of organization is the insufficient concentration of forces, especially in the second and third armies. From the standpoint of defense it is satisfactory, but if one wants to wage war on someone else's territory....

The change in the balance of power in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the detriment of the Serbs is so great that it could lead to the complete collapse of the parastatal entities on the territories of both countries, and once again push Belgrade's influence back across the Drina, where it reached at the beginning of the 20th century. The Croatian Army is already large enough and well enough equipped that it can liberate all the occupied areas at any moment. The growth in the strength of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is obvious day by day. The offensive strength of the Muslim Army is now so great that Sarajevo can count on the imminent

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liberation of at least 10 percent of the occupied territory. And spring has only begun—what about the fall?

Military analysts in Belgrade observed those trends, negative for the Serbs, a long time ago. The response was another reorganization of the "Yugoslav Army," which clearly refutes all of Milosevic's claims about the absence of any intentions whatsoever for warfare in the neighboring countries. According to that latest concept the Yugoslav Army only has two armies, the first and second, or northern and southern. That means that there is a fundamentally different grouping of forces, and that the offensive strength of the Serbian-Montenegrin army has been increased. The first or northern army has kept all the forces that previously belonged under the command of that army in Belgrade. Because it had 48 percent of all the Yugoslav Army's forces even before this last reorganization, namely about 450 tanks, 350 armored infantry vehicles, and 7,000 artillery pieces of all calibers, strengthening it would not have made much sense. For that reason, only the forces of the former second and third armies from Podgorica and Nis were merged. This resulted in a considerably larger military formation with considerable offensive capabilities. Because the second or southern army now includes 52 percent of the Yugoslav Army's forces, i.e., about 500 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers, and 7,000 cannons, it is strong enough to keep up with all of the northern army's operations. What is substantially less favorable for the southern army is the area that it covers within "Yugoslavia" itself. It has under it not only Kosovo and Sandzak, but also the restless borders with Albania and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Because of that, at least 30 percent of the southern army's strength has to be ready at any moment to perform the tasks of intimidating the population in Kosovo and Sandzak, in order for those areas to continue to remain at least apparently peaceful.

To Turn Toward the West

The new/old first army of the Yugoslav Army does not have any problems like that in its area of deployment, because it includes all of Vojvodina and most of Serbia. Because of that, all of its forces are ready at any time to turn toward the west, toward the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its main tasks are to participate in the defense of the most sensitive areas, which include eastern Slavonia and Baranja, but also the entire area of Bosnia north of Sarajevo. Also located there is the very sensitive area of the corridor through the Bosnian Sava basin, a vital communications route for the survival of all the Serbian parastatal entities west of the Drina. The southern army covers the area south of Sarajevo, which also includes the Croatian-Bosnian border in the Dubrovnik hinterland. Up until the recent Muslim offensive on Treskavica this entire region was peaceful, and in any case it is not as strategically important as the one in northern Bosnia and eastern Croatia.

And thus, while Milosevic is constantly repeating his claim that he is not involved in the conflicts on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even stubbornly claiming that the border on the Drina is completely closed, at the same time he is carrying out a reorganization of his "Yugo-Army," the only purpose of which is to increase its offensive strength. And thus, if the Serbian plans go awry on the battlefields of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic, relying upon support from Russia, will once again use the strength of the Serbian army to save the dream of a Greater Serbia, as he also did in 1991. The only difference, but the most vital one, is that today both the Croats and the Muslims are far more prepared for combat than they were at that time.

Serbia

Speculation on Contents of Frasure-Milosevic Talk

AU2405111995 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 May 95 p 12

[Article by Dragan Vujosevic: "Recognition?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We did not sign a capitulation," a NIN source added jokingly when asked about the events in the Serbian Presidency building, where the lights were on the whole night from Tuesday [16 May] to Wednesday and where U.S. Contact Group representative Robert Frasure held talks with Slobodan Milosevic.

Prior to the commencement of the talks, one of the Socialists said that nothing short of a total lifting of the sanctions would be taken into consideration. The U.S. side offered the suspension of trade sanctions for six months in exchange for the recognition of Bosnia within its existing [postojece] borders.

New details were learned after the talks.

In exchange for the recognition of Bosnia within the existing borders, however, without the recognition of the current government in Sarajevo—the sanctions in trade, financial transactions, and transit against Yugoslavia would be suspended for six months or 200 days, however, sanctions on credits for oil would remain (essentially, they would not apply because of the free transit).

However, there seems to be another catch regarding the recognition of Bosnia: Namely, it would be recognized

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as a unity of "two entities—the Muslim-Croatian and the Serbian."

It is claimed that Milosevic was told that the lifting of the oil sanctions and access to the international financial institutions would ensue following the recognition of Croatia. The NIN's sources claim that a sort of in-between option would be Milosevic recognizing the Croatian Government but not recognizing the state (the opposite than in the case of Bosnia).

It is difficult to say at the moment what in all this is accurate and what Milosevic said to Frasure and what Frasure said to him.

The NIN sources differ somewhat regarding the results of the talks. Some claim that a sort of a deal is nevertheless on the horizon while others repeat that Milosevic would not step down from the demands for the total lifting of sanctions. It is interesting that this difference regarding the outcome of the Milosevic-Frasure talks is not identical to the division into the "hard" and "soft" wings of the Socialists.

However, the NIN sources do not differ on another two details. They claim that, in the recent talks with the leadership of the Serb Republic "somewhere on the bank of the Drina River," Milosevic insisted on a radical cadre reform of "the entity" against which he had imposed sanctions.

The other detail is that the succession (that is, FRY as the successor of the SFRY) is no longer being brought into question.

Russian Envoy Zotov Begins Talks With Milosevic

AU2505133395 Paris AFP in English
1250 GMT 25 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, May 25 (AFP)—The Russian envoy to a five-nation "contact group" on former Yugoslavia started talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic Thursday in a move underlining Russia's go-it-alone attitude to the crisis.

Alexander Zotov arrived at the Serbian presidency with Russian ambassador to Belgrade Gennady Shikin, an AFP journalist at the scene confirmed.

The meeting was not mandated by Russia's partners on the five-nation contact group and Zotov said earlier he would meet Milosevic simply as "Russia's representative" in an effort to solve the Yugoslav crisis.

He stressed that his meeting was "part of the efforts by the international community" to resolve the conflict on a "fair and mutually acceptable" basis. [passage omitted]

Zotov, who said there were "no longer any grounds for continuing to maintain the sanctions against Yugoslavia," was trying to use Russia's traditional links to Serbia to find a solution.

However he admitted his position was not shared by all other contact group members while U.S. officials suggested Russian maneuvering could undermine its efforts. [passage omitted]

The contact group says Serbian recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina would mean renouncing its dream of a "greater Serbia" and pressing breakaway Serbs to accept a peace plan drawn up by the group.

However Zotov said recognition was "not necessarily a key factor" in solving the crisis, implicitly backing Belgrade's line that it could only happen at the end of the peace process.

Indeed the Yugoslav parliament declared in April 1992 that "recognition of newly-formed states will occur after questions dividing (the warring parties) have been resolved." [passage omitted]

Ukraine Official Promises Help To Lift Sanctions

LD2405163295 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1502 GMT 24 May 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 24 (TANJUG)—Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Foreign Relations Committee Boris Oleynik said here on Wednesday he will ask his parliament to make utmost efforts for lifting unjust sanctions against Yugoslavia this year.

In talks with the Serbian parliament Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Slobodan Jovanovic, Oleynik gave credit to Serbia and Yugoslavia for their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

The world must correct the mistake made towards Serbs and all citizens of Yugoslavia by the imposition of sanctions, Oleynik said, adding that his country will launch an initiative for lifting the sanctions at the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Slobodan Jovanovic gave credit to Ukraine for its objective appraisal of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and its efforts for lifting the unjust sanctions.

There is a growing number of countries which favor the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia, and less and less of those supporting the embargo, Jovanovic said.

Sanctions are affecting the entire region, but they cannot solve the problem, Jovanovic said.

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Jovanovic said that Serbia and Yugoslavia are looking for a global political solution to the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, through dialogue and compromise. The Croatian authorities, by their recent aggression on west Slavonia, have disrupted the peace process efforts of the international community, Jovanovic said.

Jovanovic pointed to the continued use of double standards by the international community towards the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and called for the adoption of a principled stand by the international community and for equal treatment of all parties.

The international community could contribute to the peaceful resolution of the crisis by lifting the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic described as significant Serbia's and Yugoslavia's cooperation with Ukraine, adding that it could be further strengthened in view of the good bases which have been established.

Belgrade Recognition of B-H Will Not Stop War

LD2405165195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1431 GMT 24 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 24 (TANJUG)—Serbia's opposition Democratic Party President Vojislav Kostunica said here Wednesday that the latest offer to Belgrade to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina would not stop the war, although the offer was more acceptable than the earlier ones. 'For the war to stop, it is necessary that the Bosnian Serb republic recognize Bosnia- Herzegovina,' Kostunica told a new conference.

The Democratic Party leader said there were differences in views in the international contact group for Bosnia, itself, with Great Britain, France and Germany being ready to agree to the lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade in exchange for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the United States insisting only on a suspension of the sanctions.

Commenting the decision taken by the Republic of Serb Krajina parliament to institute proceedings for unification with the Bosnian Serb republic, Kostunica said it was the legitimate right of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs to unite but the conditions for the unification were worse than ever.

Zastava Arms Factory Workers Threaten To Strike

AU2405131395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 95 p 16

[Article by Z. Radovanovic: "Last Attempt To Save the Factory"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kragujevac—If by 2 June the incumbent state organs fail to meet the demands of approximately 7,000 workers of Zastava-Namenski Proizvodi [Zastava-Special Purpose Production] they will go on general strike that day. This was the decision made at the session of the Namenska Proizvodnja trade unions yesterday at which a strike committee consisting of 16 members was formed.

In an earlier message to the republican and federal organs and officials, among them Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, the workers of Namenska Proizvodnja above all demanded that the state finally resolve the status of its oldest military factory. Primarily, the workers asked that the Yugoslav Army state definitively how much capacity it requires in this enterprise.

"The armorers demanded that the state settle their debts amounting to $10 million, financially assist the realization of this year's program, but also—which is the most feasible and important—that it return to them once and for all the production of heavy arms for the requirements of the Army and for export that had been taken after the war. This line of production, known as 'the Travnik Program' was reinstituted at the beginning of this year through a decision of the state authorities; however, it has recently been taken away again under mysterious circumstances." [passage omitted]

Let us point out that the Kragujevac "armorers" expect that in the strike at the beginning of June they will also be joined by workers of all other Zastava factories and town factories, and that approximately 70,000 employees of the local enterprises will stop work.

Krusik Military Plant Plans New Production

AU2405171995 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 95 p 11

[Article by Cedomir Popovic: "New Production Programs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Contrary to most so-called transition countries, which have, under pressure from outside, almost completely destroyed not only their civilian but also military industry, the FRY has preserved its intellectual and material production forces despite very difficult conditions and the pressure of the blockade. One example of this is the Valjevo Krusik factory, which, in addition to being one of the most important

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manufacturers of weapons and military equipment in the FRY, also has top civilian programs.

The factory employs 8,500, incorporates 20 joint-stock companies, and makes products for all branches of the Yugoslav Army. These range from antiaircraft and air-to-air missiles and bombs for the Air Force and Air Defense, armor-piercing weapons, mortars, and mortar bombs (in which there is a tradition going back more than 50 years), artillery shells, blocking and demolition devices, to equipment for anticommando operations and minesweeping.

Krusik has developed new production programs and they have recently received approval for three patents for three kinds of impact fuses. These were developed by a team of experts headed by Colonel Vladimir Vucetic and civilian Predrag Ristevski, graduate engineer. The new fuses should replace those that used to be produced in the seceded republics of the earlier Yugoslavia and have many advantages over them. Two of the fuses have a time device that enables 70-meter muzzle safety when a bomb is launched at minimum speed. With fuses with immediately delayed action, the type of action can be adjusted by hand without additional devices, which is something quite out of the ordinary. They have recently registered four more patents for mortar ammunition and they are going to register three more patents in this area by the end of the year.

They have constructed trial models of the new 120-mm bomb with a casing using world-class technology. It has a range of over 7,000 meters and, with the new 120-mm mortar, it should reach 9,000 meters [word or words missing] 60-mm and the 82-mm mortar that is also at the prototype stage. The new mortar has a longer barrel (1,500 mm) with heat-dissipation fins, a nonsinking [ne tone] base plate, and completely protected elevation mechanisms. It is lighter (40 kg) and easier to transport. Together with the mortar, a new 82-mm mortar bomb is being developed. The 60-mm mortar has similar advantages over the earlier type: It has a longer barrel (1,200 mm) and is lighter (23 kg).

One of the Krusik joint-stock companies, Plastika of Osecina, produces and assembles the "Zolja" 64-mm portable rocket launcher, which used to be done in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The production of the 90-mm "Osa" portable rocket launchers and the containers for them, as well as an 120-mm armor-piercing launcher, will begin soon.

New Political Decision on Kosovo Viewed

95BA0225B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 95 p 11

[Article by Branislav Radivojsa: "There Is No Hurry With the Charter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Ratko Markovic, Serbian deputy prime minister, recently told Radio Pristina that a proposed temporary statutory decision for Kosovo and Metohija will be prepared, because that obligation arises from the Constitutional Law. Once the statutory decision is adopted in the Serbian Assembly, Dr. Markovic announced, it would be possible to set up provincial authorities, including an assembly, which would then adopt the charter of the autonomous province.

On the basis of this statement, it might be said that the Republic of Serbia intends to take new steps in the direction of normalizing the situation in its southern province. That situation has been irregular for several years now, because back on 5 July 1990, in what was then the Assembly of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Serbia, a law was adopted terminating the work of the Assembly and Executive Council of the Socialist Autonomous Province [SAP] of Kosovo. The constitutional basis for dissolving the provincial authorities, it was said, were Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which state that "SR Serbia is the state of the Serbian people and of parts of other peoples and nationalities that live in it and exercise their sovereign rights," and also that "SR Serbia is unified." Because these values, in the judgment of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, were threatened, it became the "right and obligation of Serbia as a state to protect them."

What the Constitutional Law Provides

A few months after the authorities of the SAP were dissolved, on 28 September 1990, the Constitutional Law Implementing the Constitution of Serbia (Article 13) mentioned the obligation about which Deputy Prime Minister Markovic began to speak the other day. It states that the Assembly of Serbia will adopt a temporary statutory decision for the Autonomous Province [AP] of Kosovo and Metohija and will call direct secret elections to the Assembly of the province under the provisions of the Constitution and the temporary statutory decision.

The professor said that there will be no hurry in discharging those obligations in view of the political attitude of the majority Albanian population, which by and large has been boycotting the state of Serbia. And, one gets the impression, until that boycott is overcome,

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there are no prospects of holding elections in that province.

What is being announced for the present is adoption of a mechanism for preventing majority rule of the majority (Albanian) population over the numerically smaller (Serbian) population. It is assumed that that mechanism will be incorporated into the temporary statutory decision of the AP of Kosovo and Metohija that has been mentioned and that will be adopted by the republic Assembly.

Provinces Are Not States

At this point, we do not know what mechanism that is, although it should be borne in mind that the resolve of all political factors to take part in political life in the republic is more important in straightening out the situation in Kosmet than legal documents. Especially "to the measure" of the Constitution of Serbia, which does not accord particularly great rights to provinces and provincial authorities. The Albanian parties in Kosovo are very dissatisfied with those rights, so the question arises of whether they will take any part in political processes framed by the present Constitution.

At the same time, the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija might also recoil from the announcement of elections and formation of provincial authorities at a time when a large part of the Albanian population is boycotting Serbia and Yugoslavia. Would the formation of those authorities once again reduce the minority Serbian population to "second-class" citizens in their own state?

Interpreters of the Constitution say that there is little prospect of that because the supreme legal enactment in the republic accords modest rights to the provinces as compared to the previous situation. Even the province's charter, as the supreme legal document adopted by the AP Assembly, is adopted under the Constitution only with prior consent of the republic Assembly. The AP Assembly does not enact laws, but only "decisions and general acts in conformity with the Constitution and law." These assemblies do not have their own administration because the okrugs [districts], as "detached" arms of the ministries, exercise state authority in the provinces.

There are also many other indicators that the provinces are no longer de facto states, so that even the announced adoption of the temporary statutory decision for Kosovo and Metohija objectively has no particularly great political importance.

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